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THE CANADIAN STRATEGIC FORECAST 1991

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

President, Don Macnamara, OMM, CD, MA
Executive Director, Alex Morrison, MSC, CD, MA

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DON MACNAMARA

OPENING REMARKS

As the newly-elected president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies I am conscious of the tremendous responsibility I have inherited from Dr. George Bell, the CISS founding president. Dr. Bell was president for fifteen years and is responsible for the very positive reputation enjoyed by the Institute. I wish to assure you that I will do my best to promote the aims of the CISS. Their accomplishment was never more needed.

We recently had an executive committee retreat where we discussed the mission statement of the CISS which I would like to read out:

> *The CISS provides the forum and is the vehicle to stimulate the research, study, analysis and discussion of the strategic implications of major national and international issues, events and trends as they affect Canada and Canadians.*

We are convinced of the increased validity of this statement, particularly at this stage in our nation's history. Moreover, we recognize that it was only a year ago tomorrow that the Berlin Wall was breached, an event which changed the face of the security and strategic challenges, both military and non-military, for Canada. The need for informed discussion and debate has never been greater.

Canada's approach to national strategy must be to ensure that we understand that it is but a reflection of that set of policies which the government applies to our whole national capability: political, economic, and indeed,

psychological, for the promotion and preservation of our national aims and our national interests.

A year ago when we talked about the future we really did not predict what has happened in the past twelve months, nor did anybody. Even though we are currently surrounded with news about the Persian Gulf situation I think it's particularly important to take our eyes off that arena for a moment and to look at some of the many other trends that are developing in our country and around the world which will affect our national aims and our national interests.

THE CANADIAN STRATEGIC FORECAST 1991

GERALDINE KENNEY-WALLACE

GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES: INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE

Don Macnamara, President, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

It is our extremely good fortune to have as our keynote speaker today Dr. Geraldine Kenney-Wallace.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace, the President of McMaster University, is a physicist of international renown, specializing in the field of lasers and optoelectronics. She is the author of more than 90 research publications.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace studied at Oxford and London, and has held postdoctoral fellowships at the University of British Columbia and Notre Dame. She has taught at Yale and the University of Toronto, and has held visiting professorships at Ecole Polytechnique in Paris and at Stanford University. She holds ten honourary degrees and is a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace is the recipient of several awards in recognition of her research in lasers and chemical physics: the 1979 Corday Morgan Medal and prize from the Royal Society of Chemistry in England; Killam Fellow (1979); 1983 E.W.R. Steacie Fellowship; 1984 Noranda Lecture Award of the Chemical Institute of Canada; and Guggenheim Fellow for 1983.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace is a member of the National Advisory Board on Science and Technology, and the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, both headed by the Prime Minister. From 1987-1989, she was a member of the National Advisory Committee for the federal Networks

of Excellence research initiative. She chaired the Canada Awards for Business Excellence jury in 1989, and the CIDA National Advisory Panel on Centres of Excellence in International Development between 1988 and 1990.

From 1987 to 1990 Dr. Kenney-Wallace was Chairman of the Science Council of Canada to which she had been appointed as a member in 1983, then reappointed in 1986. In this position she was actively involved with all science and technology issues in public policy, including research, education, issues of industrial R&D and competitiveness, and international collaboration in the areas of science and technology. In 1988, at the request of the Prime Ministers of Canada and Japan, she led the Canada-Japan Complementarity Study which resulted in new and enhanced R&D funds and collaborations.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace, welcome to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Dr. Geraldine Kenney-Wallace

Thank you very much indeed. Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, *mesdames, messieurs,* I'm delighted to be here again with the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and to have accepted Alex Morrison's challenge to talk about the future. From your opening remarks, Mr. President, talking about the future is a very dangerous occupation these days, with things changing so fast and furiously.

But then your annual autumn seminar has a daunting title: "The Canadian Strategic Forecast for 1991". And in an autumn of discontent, and challenges in the global arena, I could spend the next half-hour or so just looking at your title.

For example, what does "Canadian" really mean? During my time as chairman of the Science Council I travelled widely in Canada and saw an unblended response to that question, an unsettled idea, many *points de vue.* Then I could look at what the word "strategic" means, and I would look across to the Persian Gulf, or to the Ukraine, or to the newly-united Germany which you have just referred to; look at African lands or look at the West Bank, and I would have to ask: "Strategic for whom?; and why?" And then I would finally settle on the word "forecast", and I would remember Kenneth Boulding's statement that one should always be surprised by the future, but not

dumbfounded. And that, I suppose, is the challenge to your speakers, all of us today, to be insightful, but not too dumbfounded, in what we say.

So today I would like to talk a little about global challenges. I would like to talk about their impact on Canada, and particularly to come down into the universities, which is why I use the phrase "strategic intelligence". There was a little bit of a pun there, but I hope you're going to think that all strategy starts with a good idea.

Now in the context of a Canadian strategic forecast I propose to bring you intelligence for the future but I want to put that into some context. I suppose the context is first and foremost a response from a new university president and vice-chancellor. At universities we are and must always be strategic, and this means that we have to look at the word "strategy" in both its military and non-military connotations. Being strategic is a mindset; it means also you're going to have to make choices.

Secondly, we are, at universities, and must be, insightful. This means we have to prepare for the unexpected – be prepared to be dumbfounded too – but mostly to prepare people to be very versatile for the future. Universities are, and must be, a national resource for Canada, and from Canada, and other parts of the world. Where better to pose questions – that are tough questions – and get the questions right, and then to search for solutions, than in the universities and colleges?

Research, scholarship and teaching are the essence of a university. But universities are not romantic or nostalgic places these days, because the communication of our research, of our teaching and our scholarship is proving to be a major challenge. Silent scholarship is no scholarship. I think I'm going, with your permission, to change what Descartes said from "*cogito ergo sum*", "I think therefore I am", to "I think therefore I *act*", and act in full awareness of the consequences of where my actions might take me. Thinking is not enough. You have to turn ideas into action.

We in the universities cannot accomplish all of this alone. That recognition is an important change, I think, over the last few years. Everybody jokes about ivory towers, and for a while I used to make jokes about "platinum, value-added towers". I have recently decided, however, that we must change all the jokes. Let's just admit that in this information age a new era of partnerships must be inaugurated. Partnerships, joint ventures, consortia, linkages, alliances on a local basis, alliances all the way through to a national and international basis – there's a whole new thesaurus at work on these words.

And to those of my friends in academe who say "*Il y a les liaisons dangereuses*", ("You have to be very careful with whom you make alliances"), I say, "absolutely"; but then there is also an equally powerful danger, and that is the danger of solitude, and the price of solitude these days is too high. We cannot work in solitude in the university or in any other sector of society. To be intelligent in an effective way, and to be strategic about intelligence, is to decide when to have your alliances, when to work in partnerships, when to do it on your own.

So I suppose I'm concluding my contextual remarks by saying that to be smart means you have to know what you know. Being intelligent is effective if you're also smart. You have to know what you know, you have to know what you don't know, and you have to find out what you need to know.

Many years ago when I was growing up in Europe – and I'm sure this phrase was everywhere, it was a military phrase – we worked on a "need to know" principle, because information was power and power was the basis of action. I would say now the need to know, while a strategic phrase then is equally a strategic phrase now, because it implies a controlled flow of information, and it does imply, in the old "need to know" sense, security classifications and information for action. For strategic reasons and national causes I would say now the need to know comes from a totally different perspective.

Nowadays "need to know" is a phrase accompanied by an oversupply of information, not an undersupply. The challenge of interpreting the phrase "need to know" these days is to realize the enormity of the information to which you have access and which is coming through at daunting rates on facsimile machines, data transmissions, fibre optic cables, satellites and so forth. Then you must be able to organize your information, and organize what information you need in order to act. Power is no longer derived solely from information, it is derived from an ability to organize your information in time to put some action into place.

Today, fibre optic lines, which are in place or will be all in place by the mid-1990s, are linking continents around the world. Trans Atlantic Telecommunication-8, for example, can simultaneously carry 40,000 phone calls between here and Europe on a laser-driven fibre optic Morse code link. Information can be tuned in on light pulses, just like you can AM and FM tune your radios.

In addition, there are Hawaiian fibre optic lines (HAW), Pacific Rim lines, Trans-Pacific Continent lines, and lines going into Hong Kong and into Australia. There is a proposed line between Moscow and Tokyo which may one day be the fibre optic link on the new Trans-Siberian bridge. Fibre optic cables have created a world in which, "oceans link, they no longer divide" and have put a totally different interpretation on the phrase "need to know". They are not the silk roads of trade of the old days but are the fibre optic communication links of the trade world of now and tomorrow. And this is the source of all the information which is driving us all.

Now, who's using these links? Because so much of what is happening these days in Canada's growing industrial sector is done crossing time zones, crossing linguistic zones, through facsimile machines and other such communications devices, and because 65 percent to 70 percent of this occurs in our expanding service industry, you can't just measure what's going on in manufacturing and capture a complete idea of the volume of activity in world trade or world activity of any sort. And so over the past couple of years people have been monitoring international telephone traffic and are able to break this down into specific detail. For example, it is possible to determine how many phone calls are going from Germany into the U.K or how many are going from North America into South America; so you can take this down to more and more detailed levels.

I am discussing fibre optics and their ability to transmit information around the world to get you interested in new measures of international activity along those knowledge networks. And if you look at some countries, you can look at Japan, for example, and plot what has been happening in that part of the world over recent years you see sudden changes, and you wonder why. All of a sudden the long-distance telephone call charges changed because the regulatory environment changed, and all of a sudden the way of doing business and communicating changed. So from these kinds of data you cannot only look at the flow of information going back and forth in a macroscopic sense, you can also see the sudden impact of regulatory changes on communications. You must also see the impact of standards, different international standards, one standard in North America, another standard in Europe – or hopefully a common standard by 1992. These kinds of data show a different world at work and are increasingly of interest to us as we monitor what is happening.

Information is exploding in content, it's also exploding in breadth, it's also very global, and those are the networks which are driving us now and driving the pace of information flow over the next decade.

There is, however, one thing that has not changed, and that is our role as humans in all of this, which is why I said the challenge is not so much "need to know" but how to organize all this information on a need to know basis. The human ability to pause and reflect and decide and act has not changed. There is temporarily, in my opinion, a mismatch between the flow of information and the time-scales over which people expect a response to the daily facsimiles, and the time required to pause and reflect and make human judgments which are also very much part of strategic thinking. So whether we have blended our measured judgment, our logic, or our instinctive responses, I think the whole of our response to this new information and this need to know and the pressures to know more is a little bit like a souffle: our ability can rise or fall according to the temperature, but it very much depends on the climate outside.

Given this information flow, and given the human decision-making process which ultimately is involved, let me now move back onto the subject of our educational system and its future. We must question what is happening around the world and the universities to respond to one question: for which century are we educating and doing research?

Let me begin with a premise. The roots of competitiveness lie in the education system, just as the roots of a just and caring society are co-mingled there. I'm not going to try and cover the entire education system, I'm going to focus particularly on universities, but I think it is people and ideas and the empowerment of ideas that bring about social, cultural, political, economic, military, and strategic change. It is our attitudes, born of ethos, and education, of our experiences, born of our confidence, and born as much of our fear of the unknown, that tests our very human stuff, our response to the fear of the unknown. And it is these attitudes that shape our society. And what I see in the education system today, in fact what I see in Canada as a whole, is a reluctance to admit to opinions that we need, opinions on making choices, opinions on making decisions for ourselves, opinions on simply getting on with it and not spending any more time on the problems but starting to look for some of the solutions and putting them into play. It is those attitudes which are formed and which are then further shaped in our universities, and in our colleges.

Now if I were to go into a university today, into an economics or a political science or an engineering class, would I hear discussions about the tripolar global economy? Would I hear discussions about the current accounts surpluses that are changing Japan or the cost of reunification in Germany? Would I hear discussions about where the capital is going to come from for all of this investment and innovation that as Chairman of the Science Council I spent a lot of time talking about and will continue to talk about? Who really understands the incredible changing economics? Perhaps the bankers, the finance people, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Revenue do – but is this communicated further out? What are we teaching in our classes to the people? Are we teaching the economics of our past or the economic challenges of the future?

Let me go on. In the business schools are we teaching, are we exploring, are we exposing our people to the new global interdependence in the flow of capital and goods and services? Are we looking at the increased movement of people, whether it's for business or pleasure?

Are we looking at the globalization of the economy not as a phenomenon which requires a homogeneous response, and in the process giving people the impression that we're all going to look the same in a decade or two? Or are we realizing that powerful nations and corporations will always compete and manipulate economies and markets? We are always going to have local differences, and pressure in one place may lead to a different response in another. However, the state of the world economy, as a result of global interdependence and the flow of goods, capital and services, may develop a Canadian system which may well be dominated in the next decade by a small number of globally-deployed corporations clustered around key technologies. The reason this is possible are these knowledge networks that are in place. You can decentralize your decision-making, you can be in communication with whatever you wish to be in nanoseconds (that's a billionth of a second). You can be doing your research and development in one part of the world and communicating the results somewhere else. You can set up pilot plants in one place but have all the designs and controls being run from thousands of miles away.

It is a totally different world and we have to look at it. We have to make sure that the students in our classes understand this is the world they're learning to play a part in; that they have to be not only broad-minded, versatile, creative and critical thinkers, but they had better be in touch, in

resonance with the reality of today which is not always the reality of the textbooks.

The market is driving more and more new trends and decisions. Timely response to the market is increasingly important as we have seen in the past few years. Will market forces become stronger than national policies? Or will national policies begin to take on a different kind of significance? Some people say "no" to the latter possibility. Rather, the market may be driven by population density and world trade focal points as may be the case in the Pacific Rim. By the year 2000, 50 percent of world trade will be in the Pacific Rim, along with 50 percent of the population.

A hundred years ago when McMaster was only thirteen years old I would imagine there were people walking in the halls at the University worrying about getting ready for the 20th Century. And look at what happened. Look at the incredible things they were dealing with then. We're still seeing some of the roots of technological change that happened at that time. I was delighted to find out that Hamilton was the first place to get a high-tech telephone switchboard at the turn of the last century. These days most of the people in Hamilton don't even know that. Nobody thinks about the technologies that have been in play for over a hundred years. Just imagine what people were thinking about with this newfangled business called "aerospace". If you look at optoelectronics, which is driving the knowledge networks, you will find that it was a Scottish cleric named James Kerr who in the 1890s reported the first effect, known as the "Kerr Effect", on which now a $10 billion industry is based. It took until the 1960s before anyone really understood the science, the research, behind this to put it into play, however. Optoelectronics now means using light to carry signals, electricity of now and in the future.

So much of what we're doing now actually has very, very long roots, and perhaps before we get too brave about forecasting the future we should understand the time-scales over which change takes place. And therefore, we must look back in the university, and question if we really teach change and teach time-scales. We understand research, we understand the power of ideas, but do we understand the power of change and how long it sometimes takes to bring about change? Universities should be leading change, not reluctantly acquiescing to change.

So there's a lot we have to do, and a lot of what we have to do is to associate ourselves with the realities of what is happening in the world.

Getting knowledge organized and quickly matched to needs, be they market needs, intellectual needs, strategic needs, is the key to competitiveness, intellectual or economic. Increasingly, this is going to mean that we need to tackle new concepts in terms of risk assessment. Risk is different in finance than it is in technology; risk is different in politics than it is genetic engineering. The concepts of risk, talking about environment, talking about AIDS – are these taught, are these tackled? Are ethics brought into consideration, from the medical to the business schools? We have just created a chair in Biomedical Ethics at McMaster University. We must have a set of common values and common ethics – or common respect for the ethics – from which we work.

Have we looked at the demographics? There will soon be tremendous competition for skilled, trained workers. Just look at the demographic trends now, let alone over the last decade. The resulting emphasis on human capital, which is the current phrase meaning people who are smart, people who have brains, people who are going to be working in all sectors of society; the current emphasis on human capital is going to create even higher demands on training, whether it's on the factory floor or whether it's in the boardroom in professional upgrading. It's also going to require higher demand for science and technology skills, for the technological capacity for the workforce.

I have said in a sense that the competition for a skilled workforce very much comes from demographic trends. The competition is exacerbated by the fact that the skills which are required have a higher scientific or technological input that has been needed in the past. Now very often I've discovered that when one starts talking about investments in science and technology people often think that you're just there looking for more money to go into the research labs. No, this is a far, far more powerful and broader argument.

If one looks at the number of scientists and engineers, in the broadest definition, per unit population of a country, as a function of the gross production in the manufacturing sector in U.S. dollars it appears that the higher the number of scientists and engineers in the population, the larger the production in the manufacturing sector. Recently, Pakistan, the Philippines, Argentina, Korea, Canada, the U.K., France, West Germany, Japan and the United States were compared to that very simple index. Now I'm not going to argue that there is a precise algorithm or analytical expression that I can write down

to explain this. I'm just saying that if you'll accept the number of scientists and engineers as a proxy for the technological capacity of the workforce of a country, then we have here a very compelling correlation between the technological capacity and the manufacturing output of each country. That is why we have to get more science and technology skills into the workforce, and that starts in the schools and in the education system. Those of you who have not been recently on the floor of a factory should go and see what is required to even set up something like a milling machine. The first thing is courses in computers and software these days. And those of you who have not recently been to a telephone exchange, go and see what is happening. The next time you go into a supermarket pay attention to the laser reading the bar code. That's what we used to do in graduate school, 20 years ago.

What is going on in the research laboratories now is going to profoundly change our lives and influence all of us in 10, 15, 20 years time. You don't have to wait to see it. Go and visit the laboratories and you'll see the roots of it right now.

First of all we need people. Then you need resources to put into the people. We see a very powerful and compelling correlation between what you invest and what you leverage out in terms of Gross Domestic Product. You cannot leverage on what you have not invested. These are inputs, this is output.

Once again, to those of you who may be economists, I will not write down an analytic expression saying a dollar in here means ten dollars there; it's far too complicated a society. But you have to understand the structure of your economics to know where your investment should be. You also have to understand the industrial sector, the educational opportunities, where your strengths lie in research and development, and where the barriers exist that prevent advancement, back to costs of capital, costs of energy, transportation, environment regulation. There's a lot of complexity built into the relationships between these two. It's not so complex that we can't deal with it, and it is absolutely at the basis of strategic thinking about resources for the future.

I hope I've made you want to know more about why research investments into people, into universities, into science and technology are so important and have an impact far outside the laboratory or the library. If we were to go into the business schools of today, and then go and visit the modern language departments inside the universities, I hope we would find people realizing that if you're going to do business in the Pacific Rim you had bet-

ter understand the culture, the history and some of the languages. And I hope the people in the history departments and the geography departments are mixing with their colleagues.

In the management schools it's important to realize the impact on doing business through cultural connections, and doing business through understanding some fairly hard things like the relative merits of intellectual property, the role of the jurisdiction and international lawyers, and the difference between a contract and the shaking of a hand. Every society is different; that is the world we're working in. Where better an opportunity to learn about our different societies, to learn about history and culture and geography, to learn the languages than in the university? Once again, I'm not claiming that the university is the only place in the world to know or to learn. What I am claiming is that if you don't see it as one of the most exciting places to go to, to learn, and to inquire, and to be challenged then we've got a problem.

What are the consequences of our failure to act upon these kinds of ideas? Well, if we don't start to invest in research and development in all areas, then what will happen in Canada is that the deficits will increase even more. We're going to be unable to maintain not only the education system that I'm talking about, but also unemployment insurance, social security and so forth. The costs of caring are exploding. The action on competitiveness is not catching up at all. Our resource-based industries, which have been of immense importance in shaping where we are now, are not going to take us through the 1990s without value added from research and development. And what is going to take their place? As you read the front pages and business pages of the daily newspapers you see the restructuring that's going on; mergers and acquisitions are hotter than fusion in the sun. But what is taking the place of what we knew? Agriculture, if we don't take care of sustainable development practices, will collapse. We'll abandon the land; soil erosion will prevent the land from producing as much as it has which has enabled us not to worry about food security for over a generation.

What are we going to do about water? We have more water than many other countries. What are we doing? Why is it in one part of the country there are seventeen federal agencies and sixteen provincial agencies responsible for water management practices? There is much to do here, much we are challenged by, and much which we need some strategic thinking on. So we go to our environmental departments and we mix in economists and health scientists, and we mix in business people and government policy experts

and we say to them, "If you could start again how would you design this particular system?" It's a management problem, it's a systems problem, and we must set our students to go and to be challenged by the reality of now, but also to be part of the solution for tomorrow.

Let me now conclude my talk with a few comments on change-making. Change-making is never popular. Ask any university president. Ask anybody who's involved in change. The status quo is always much more comfortable, and we are constantly, we not just in this country, but we around the world, facing change everywhere. We're seeing an awful lot of change in our global village over which we have no particular personal control. And if you don't have any local personal control, this is a source of immense stress and unease.

So we also have to teach people how to learn and how to be comfortable with not knowing. I began by talking about knowledge and knowing, knowing what you need to know. We also have to learn to know that there are some things we are not going to know, and we must not be always uncomfortable with not knowing. That's actually what research is all about. The biggest thing you learn when you're doing any research or graduate work is to learn how much you don't know, and to accept that not knowing goes with the territory; that it's your challenge now to get out there and to pose questions to get the answers.

In the universities we have to be very diplomatic about change. But then of course we have these enormous resources called people involved in research programmes. They are used to dealing with, or are increasingly getting more comfortable with dealing with, the unknown. Maybe in the universities when we're talking and walking in the corridors just like in any other institution, the diplomacy we practice is the art of letting someone else have your way.

Universities are both evolutionary and revolutionary, and learning the difference about when to be evolutionary or revolutionary is also a diplomatic art. There are endless debates and arguments of a scholarly nature, and these days the green groves of academe are shaking a little. Positions are polarizing, they're arguing from positions of cutbacks, malaise and lack of budgets. Do you know that over the decade mid-70s to 80s enrolment in the universities across Canada increased by more than 69 percent while the increase in public expenditures was approximately four percent? No wonder

universities are crowded and life is a continual series of meetings on deferred maintenance.

The fabric of university life needs attention too, just like the fabric of the planet needs attention through sustainable development and the environment issues we're all trying to deal with in a very concerned, if somewhat belated way. The university fabric needs attention because in order to bring about change anywhere there must be a pride of place -- not only a sense of place and a sense of direction, but a pride of place.

Now in a university, in an academic setting, calm can always be brought to an argument. Individuals will be polarized, voices argue loudly, minds divide, a chasm appears, and then what you have to do is remind yourself of the old Chinese proverb, "Two leaps per chasm is fatal". If you don't make it in one, it's game over.

Often, sitting in the University Senate I'm reminded of George Orwell's proposition that sometimes only the intellectuals are crazy enough to worry about such issues. Today we intellectuals are very crazy because we're worrying about a lot of issues, but these are issues which have to do with nation-shaping. At the beginning of my remarks I said that I would like to have had universities as a source of strategic intelligence for the future, I suppose it's because my questions could be all put in the following way: Who is the new world now? Look at where the population is, look at the demographics. Which century are we educating for?

Look at the challenges, whether they are fiscal, economic, societal, social – because, you see, we in the universities are accountable, we have to fight for our autonomy through our accountability. But ultimately we are accountable for shaping ideas because we shape people. And those people are going to go out into all walks of life, whether it's to the labour unions, or it's into government or the private sector, whether they're going to write poetry, or be policy-makers, or military strategists, whether they're going to be nurses in the hospitals or whether they're going to be running information technology systems, or whether indeed they're going to compose music that will bring us all together through a different set of cultural responses, all these people are in our classrooms now and in our lecture rooms. The future is here; it just hasn't revealed itself.

Through education, through research and through service to society we at the universities are accountable to you and to that future. And we at the same time do what we do through our credibility, through our governance,

by almost invisible consent. We work with our peers, we work with our corporate side, we work with governments and we work with society, but most of all we must all work together because we are all of human stuff. We realize our potential together, we realize that we must work on excellence, we have to strive in every tiny little task every day. We must work with a common and shared set of values and ethics, and most of all a respect for human dignity.

These are perhaps solemn words from a university president whose students are joining thousands of others today at lunchtime in a rally in front of Queen's Park with the slogan of "Education now!". But listen to them, they're right. They're bold enough to ask the questions. They're bold enough to even think they've got all the answers. But isn't that what it's all about? Remember the words of Wordsworth: "It was bliss on the French Revolution, it was bliss to be alive at dawn, but to be young was very heaven!"

FORUM

John Weber, General Electric Canada

Dr. Kenny-Wallace, you made an interesting observation that enrolment in the universities has grown 69 percent and that public funding has grown four percent. You and many of your students and colleagues will be protesting today or indicating that you believe the balance ought to shift on the spending side. I'd like you to address the argument that possibly we've made education too universal and that in fact we're not adequately screening and carefully parcelling our resources so that they go to the students who have the most potential in the areas that will generate the most wealth for this nation in the future.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace

I think your question is a very important one because if you threw money at the present system I personally do not believe we would solve all the

problems. That doesn't mean to say that it should be an argument of accessibility versus excellence. I was at a Canada-U.K. colloquium a couple of years ago, looking at precisely the rebuttal you have just presented. We were seeing that in many cases in the U.K. excellence was in good shape but accessibility was not and in Canada accessibility was in pretty reasonable shape but excellence needed some attention, which I think is at the thrust of your question.

At the present time I can only speak for what I'm doing in my own institution. We are in the middle of an enormous strategic planning process. Somebody once said that the role of a strategic planning process is to go through it and then throw away the plan and get on with what you now know ought to be done. But the point is, I would also say this process is a strategic catharsis. We are now talking about those kinds of questions, we are now looking to see where, frankly, we should have strengthened our case in some areas, and maybe admit we're not the best in the world in another area, and if there's another institution or another programme or another part of the country that's doing a better job, maybe we should join forces and see if we couldn't leverage up in that way.

What is absolutely fascinating is the fact that throughout this strategic planning process we've had input from the students, the staff, the faculty, the alumni, the business people, the residents of the immediate community we're living in – everybody has been involved – and the fascinating thing was to get people to realize that we wanted them to be involved and they could make a difference. As soon as we began to get that set of attitudes changed, then we could get to the ones that you were talking about, looking at accessibility and looking at excellence.

I do indeed think that we need to commit more funds to the system. In Ontario, for example, the number of dollars per student is the lowest in the country. However, the question of what is a reasonable expenditure is a far more complicated answer because we have to look and see what it is we're trying to accomplish in the universities, because we also have community colleges, vocational institutes – we have a whole plethora of institutions involved in higher education. And I think one of the things that has been difficult over the last decade – maybe the last two decades – is that there has been an increasing confusion of roles, of who's supposed to be doing what. And if everybody is asked to do more with fewer dollars, then at some point the inevitable is going to happen. If we know what our mission or mandate

is in the university, then let us decide what resources we need to accomplish that, let's put performance into place, let's be accountable and let's deliver. But let us not have performance demands placed on us which cannot be met. If we have a time of short resources, we'll simply have to have fewer projects.

So your question is good, there's no simple answer. There's no question that the fat has gone. The point is now, who's going to pay for the next frying pan?

Major Arthur Gans, CFB Toronto

During your presentation you showed us a number of communication lines. If you took a map and took the demography of the world you would have seen that almost two thirds of the world wasn't connected at all; Africa, South America and large portions of Asia aren't even considered in those fibre optic networks. So what I'm suggesting is that perhaps we need to do a whole lot more studying about Africa, Asia and South America because that's where an awful lot of the future of the world may very well be. Would you comment?

Dr. Kenney-Wallace

Yes, your point is well taken. First of all I should say that many of those systems I discussed are in place, and most will be in place by 1995. Secondly, not every single fibre optic network was discussed either. There is a significant number in parts of Asia, China in particular which are being planned. To go to the substance of your point, South America is hooking in very fast but that is because they know they have to hook in and experts are being sent to different countries. They have an educational infrastructure which can put these technologies into place – it comes back to education again. Other parts of the world don't have these communication lines, you are absolutely right, but you must realize, hooking fibre optics into a village in the Sahel in Africa is not going to solve the water problem there. I'm not suggesting by any means that everything is taking place on fibre optics in the

future. What I'm suggesting is that if you take information from that village in the Sahel, consider their needs, and you put it on that knowledge network, maybe you'd get a stronger response from many other people around the world who would be willing to give time and ideas and energy to solve some of the very serious human problems that exist in the world today.

So the knowledge network isn't just connecting an elite. The knowledge network can bring information on everybody's world to a much wider audience. If you believe in the global village, the village has to look after itself, but first of all the village needs to know what's going on in other areas than the ones usually covered by just its local newspapers.

Mr Ian Brodie, University of Calgary

Dr. Kenny-Wallace, I came in last night from Calgary for this conference. I was entirely able to do that due to the generous travel support programme that this institute provides to students across Canada. I see in the audience here several students today who are also the beneficiaries of that generous programme and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the donors to the travel programme who were able to bring us here today. The travel programme is one of those wonderful alliances that Dr. Kenney-Wallace talked about that helps get some of us away from the daily pressures of thesis deadlines and course topics and so on and out into the real world to see what is going on there. On behalf of the CISS and all present here today I'd like to thank you, Dr. Kenney-Wallace, for your wide-ranging and expansive comments that highlight some of the strategic trends in the university sector.

H. DALE ANDERSON

A REVIEW OF 1990 AND HOW JAMAICA WILL DEAL WITH THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF 1991

John Harbron, CISS Senior Research Fellow

Our next speaker is Mr. H. Dale Anderson, High Commissioner of Jamaica to Canada.

Mr. Anderson has been High Commissioner to Canada since 1987. He was educated at the University of the West Indies and at McGill University in Montreal, where he received an M.A. in Political Science.

A career diplomat, High Commissioner Anderson joined the Jamaican Ministry of External Affairs in 1963. He has been posted to Washington, Mexico City, and to the Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations. At home he has served as Director of the Political Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kingston. Mr. Anderson has led delegations to meetings of Commonwealth senior officials and has represented Jamaica at several other international conferences.

Prior to his current assignment, Mr. Anderson served as Deputy High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. During this period he was Chairper-

son of the Administrative, Financial and Legal Affairs Committee of the International Maritime Organization and served as Second Vice Chairman of the International Coffee Council.

High Commissioner H. Dale Anderson

Today I will give you a review of 1990, and how Jamaica will deal with the national and international challenges and opportunities of 1991.

It might be useful to locate Jamaica, physically, historically and socially in your consciousness so that you can better understand the relevance of my presentation. We are an English-speaking island in the Caribbean, of 4,411 square miles with 2.3 million people of African, European, Asian and some Middle Eastern heritage, about an hour's flight from Miami, 90 miles south of Cuba (we all know where that is), 3.5 hours from Toronto, and on roughly the same longitude as Ottawa.

For somewhat more than a century and a half – 1494 to 1655 – Spain was in possession of the Island. Thereafter, the British took over and ran things through a succession of different types of government to 1962 when we became fully independent with a well entrenched parliamentary system of government based on the Westminster Model. There are two Houses of Parliament – a Senate of 21 members appointed for five years by the two leading political parties – and a 60 seat House of Representatives. Queen Elizabeth the second is our Head of State represented by a Governor General who is a native Jamaican, with a Prime Minister and a leader of the opposition. There is universal adult suffrage, and elections are due every five years under a first past the post system.

From a total dependency on sugar (and rum), to later diversification into bananas, citrus and a few other primary crops exported to guaranteed protected markets in the U.K., through mining (bauxite and alumina) the economy has developed certain non-traditional sectors with tourism as our main earner of foreign exchange at the moment. We have been moving into light manufacturing, agro-industry, electronic assembly and information processing.

The U.S. is now our major economic partner. America is our largest export market, source of investment, tourists, foreign aid and imports. The U.K. and Canada follow, providing an assured access for most of the products

we export under a number of trading arrangements. Diversification into Asia and more South-South contact are underway. We are a member of the UN system, English speaking Commonwealth and several regional organizations linking us to Latin America, the rest of the Caribbean and North America.

As a small island developing nation whose fate depends critically on external factors we play an active part in international affairs – political, economic and human rights issues around the world are of great concern to us. And when we look around us today, we see a world which in major respects is substantially different from the one we have known for the last 45 years. Because of our limited options and our vulnerability developing countries like mine find these changes particularly daunting, whether they be perceived as challenges or opportunities.

A persistent and growing imbalance between the economic experiences and immediate prospects of the developing world is a most striking feature of the economic landscape today. While the developed countries and a handful of developing countries have been enjoying a prolonged period of steady growth and unprecedented levels of affluence, as far as most developing countries are concerned, 1990 has capped what has been aptly described as the "lost" decade. Generally speaking, per capita income in Latin America and the Caribbean declined to such an extent that living standards are now significantly lower than in the 1970s. In contrast, average per capita income in the industrialized countries is approximately 50 times that of less developed countries.

Population growth, declining productivity, rising unemployment, and falling real wages in many developing countries have created severe economic stress, resulting in increased poverty. Debt distressed countries have been forced to undertake structural adjustment programmes which have resulted in re-allocation of development resources and the reordering of socio-economic priorities. The decade of the 90s has been one of sustained adjustment efforts.

Yet, for many of us, economic and social progress continues to be elusive. This is so primarily because the initiatives that have so far been taken have had as their major objective the maintenance of debt servicing flows, the protection of creditor institutions and the maximum avoidance of either political risk or additional financial commitments by creditor countries. All of these

objectives have been attained. Creditor countries have been the beneficiaries of a net transfer of resources from developing debtor countries, and have enjoyed steady economic growth and rising standards of living.

At the beginning of 1990, developing countries owed US $1.3 trillion to overseas creditors, having grown from US $1.1 trillion in three years. Growth with stabilization has not materialised, despite the aims of the 'Baker plan.' Happily the 'Brady Plan' explicitly recognizes that direct and positive steps have to be taken to reduce the totality of debt itself, even if this involves some cost to the lending institutions and the provision of incremental resources by creditor countries.

Though an acutely debilitating one, deterioration in our external debt situation is only one of the major changes in the international system with which we have to contend. There are:

- the further globalization of trade, finance and production structures;
- the trend towards regionalism;
- the continued evolution towards a multipolar world economy and political configuration, with Europe, Japan and East Asia playing a more dynamic role;
- political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including the reunification of Germany.

Add to this list Mr. Chairman:

- increased preoccupation with environmental degradation and the quest for sustainable development;
- protectionism;
- trade in illicit drugs;

and the pressures and constraints on a small country become monumental.

Regionalization as another aspect of this 1990 international configuration threatens further marginalization of small dependent economies. Most of Jamaica's trade over the years has been tied to its special relationship with Europe under the Lomé Agreement, and to the United States and Canada through various preferential arrangements. Now, the erosion of these facilities by the removal of constraints to trade and investment within these large powerful groupings forces a reassessment of our position in the inter-

national economic order. Whether it be cut flowers or rum under Caribcan, or rum, bananas and sugar under Lomé, most of the exports on which our economy depends will find it difficult to compete.

Despite the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks, and especially if it fails, 1990 clearly presented an ominous trend towards greater protectionism in international trade. This comes at a time when developing countries are making courageous attempts to diversify their economies, with a wider range of exports in order to grow out of the economic distress of the 1980s. We hope that the lessons of the 1930s have been learnt so that a slow-down in economic growth will not lead to even greater protectionism against developing countries like mine.

There is also an ongoing debate about the implications for countries such as Jamaica, of the opening up of Eastern Europe. Cynics might well find support in the fact that, within four months, the developed Western powers in conjunction with the Soviet Union and other states were able to agree on the concept of an Eastern European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; agree on its charter, name a president, establish an office and put up US $12 billion.

It is to be recalled that the major voting powers in the IMF have for years refused to expand the resources of that institution, although allocated resources are known to be inadequate to address the requirements of developing countries. Remember that the IMF and the World Bank have steadfastly found it inappropriate to view Third World debt in multilateral terms. None of this is to criticize the principle of assistance to Eastern Europe. It is, however, a measure of the complex task that confronts a country like mine. We are frankly concerned that the lure, even allure, of an open Eastern Europe will be too powerful for Western capital to resist, to the detriment of less resource rich economies like mine.

Let us look at this from another angle. The Cold War might be over but to the extent that moderation of superpower ideological and territorial competition reduces the strategic importance of some developing countries, the inclination of the major powers to extend economic assistance and cooperation decreases.

Compounding all of this is our sensitive awareness of the need to protect the environment at a time when economic hardships force us to follow practices which do damage to our natural habitat. The truth has not been lost on developing countries that their developed brothers, having advanced

through the industrial technological and information revolution to affluence and prosperity at great environmental cost, now seek to deny that path to others, while closing other alternatives to economic growth. Therein lies a dilemma which calls for the greatest understanding from developed countries.

Similar empathy is necessary as small vulnerable societies and economies like mine face up to the international dangers of illicit drugs, both trafficking and use. That is a task that a small nation cannot manage on its own.

As so often happens, events occur which appear external to the inner dynamic of the structured evolution of international affairs. Just as often they compound our problems. Such an event is the present crisis in the Persian Gulf. Jamaica depends on imported oil for 95 percent of its energy needs. This represents a substantial proportion of our budgetary expenditure in foreign exchange. Add the "knock-on" effect throughout the economic system of oil prices at $31-$41 per barrel, from a previous level of $16-$18, and the impact on a fragile economy is starkly apparent.

If that is the landscape that 1990 has unfolded to us, how is Jamaica responding to it?

Not only do most of the realities of 1990 pose a danger to our economic prospects they must also be perceived as offering a challenge to overcome them and to identify whatever opportunities that might also be present.

While foreign aid continues to be important, Jamaica's thrust has been to maximize opportunities for investment in the economy, both from local and international sources. We will do this through:

1. Diplomatic initiatives to seek debt relief, reduction and rescheduling as short term means of financing our budget;
2. Measures to influence international multilateral agreements in order to encourage structures which facilitate more balanced terms of trade for developing countries;
3. Regional integration as a strategy to support our external trade initiatives. The ability of the Caribbean region to negotiate effectively in the wider international community will depend on unified approaches;
4. Expansion of intra-regional trade by deepening regional market penetration;

5. Diversification of trading partners without prejudice to existing trade relations;
6. Strategies to take advantage of new opportunities created by the changed economic and political structures of Eastern Europe;
7. Measures to increase foreign inflows and import substitution; and
8. Negotiations to increase the benefits of existing preferential trade agreements.

Success in most of these areas depends on a solution to the debt problem. There have been some promising signals. Earlier, I alluded to the Brady Plan. Recently, the government of Canada wrote off $182 million of official bilateral debt owed by a number of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, including my own.

But countries like Jamaica, the bulk of whose debt is to multilateral institutions cannot be assisted by the ad hoc bilateral approach of initiatives such as the Brady Plan. Similarly, as successful as debt conversion schemes are, they are problem ridden, and cover only a fraction of the total debt. Multilateral agencies should be permitted to restructure or defer debt servicing payments to them, or they should be empowered to create some sort of refinancing fund which can be used to prevent member developing countries from becoming net transferrers of resources.

Jamaica has argued these points before these multilateral financial institutions, with specific proposals on how they might proceed and has exhorted industrialized countries, including Canada, to support our initiative. Indeed, there are a number of such proposals. What is lacking is the political will among creditor countries and the unity of purpose among debtor developing countries to insist on a comprehensive approach.

How are we responding to developments in Europe? As a signatory to the Lomé IV convention which was signed in December 1989, we will enjoy preferential access to the European Community. Financial resources will be available under the European Development Fund for a wide range of national and regional projects for both the public and private sectors. We will also seek to access technical assistance benefits. However, our success in meeting the challenges of Europe 1992 will depend primarily on our competitiveness both in the products we export to a greatly expanded and prosperous market of 320 million, and in attracting investment capital and technology.

At the same time we are making every diplomatic effort to ensure that preferences we now receive are not eroded in any way, at least over the short term. Our concern is that we do not find ourselves in a less favourable situation after 1992 than we are in now. Whatever opportunities exist for trade, investment and tourism in the new Europe will be tapped by Jamaica. It has been suggested, for example, that with the drive to modernize their economies, Eastern Europe may need to import relatively labour-intensive manufactures such as leather goods, wood products, toys and sports equipment. There already exists demand for agricultural and agro-industrial products, as well as services, which can be met by medium and small business enterprises.

A similar approach applies to our economic relations with North America. Every effort is being made to maximize our comparative trade, investment and tourism advantages in geographical proximity, lower labour costs, location and climate at the bilateral and regional levels. Under the Caribcan Trade and Investment Arrangement with Canada, and the Caribbean Basin Initiatives (CBI) with the U.S., we seek to expand the volume of trade and investment at the same time as we seek to expand the number and range of products which qualify for duty free entry into these markets.

These call for persistent and skilful negotiating in the public and private sectors. Ironically, the more competitive we become, the greater the likelihood of protectionist barriers being raised against the products we seek to export.

Our efforts will be directed at:

- strengthening of the economic integration movement in the Caribbean-Caricom;
- strengthening and expanding our links with Latin America, through new structures and by building on existing ones;
- seeking a structured relationship in or with any region-wide arrangement which develops out of the Bush "Enterprise for the Americas" initiative, including the Mexico-Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement;
- negotiating adequate protection for concessions under the Carbican arrangement for our exports whose competitiveness might be eroded by the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement;
- expanding and strengthening South-South cooperation through the South Commission and similar structures;

- greater and more organized utilization of the resources presented by our nationals and their descendants who now make various countries overseas their homes;
- development of our human resources to meet the new demand for technological skills; and
- deepening the free enterprise character of the Jamaican economy. The government has undertaken an extensive programme of deregulation and privatization.

Under this policy:

1. The private sector will be the main vehicle for growth;
2. The public sector will have as its main role the provision of the appropriate policy framework and infrastructure to support the private sector; and
3. An open, export-led approach to growth is critical for national development.

Even if we succeed in all of the above, our efforts will come to nothing unless the problem of trafficking in illicit narcotic drugs, and their use is solved. That is why we have taken the issue to the UN and argued for effective international policing of the traffic and production of narcotics, together with drug demand reduction. For it is fruitless for Jamaica to reduce the production of marijuana to 0.5 percent from 6 percent 1985-88 – among five leading producers – only to see U.S. production more than double to satisfy unrestrained demand.

Jamaica was a member of the Group of Experts appointed by the UN to assist the Secretary-General in examining the modalities for more effective action within the UN system. The Group's recommendations have been submitted to the Secretary-General for consideration, and we expect the prompt establishment of an integrated structure through which member states can more effectively coordinate their efforts on all aspects of the drug problem. We also participated fully in the World Ministerial Summit to reduce demand for drugs and to combat the cocaine threat, held in the U.K. last April. That Summit was a success.

This is intended to complement and support local action. On the domestic front, Jamaica has instituted a well thought-out policy of:

- research and development of a data base;

- public and school education programmes;
- community involvement activities;
- health and medical measures of treatment and rehabilitation;
- demand reduction, law enforcement measures;
- economic and alternative income programmes; and
- legal reform at the local level.

Jamaica looks towards 1991 realistically, but with guarded optimism rather than fear. Tourism is expanding. The bauxite and alumina industry continues to show strength, though with some signs of weakening. New sectors like off-shore data processing, data entry, and electronics assembly are expected to expand as the government's policy releases the drive and efficiency of the private sector. Contributions of overseas Jamaicans are being mobilized as critical inputs into the country's development. Added to this is an intensive and vigorous campaign to attract foreign investment.

I can only exhort the international community to put its house in order, through new thinking, fundamental restructuring and economic growth so that we can all benefit from our inter-locking inter-dependence rather than it be strangled by it.

UKERU MAGOSAKI

JAPAN: NEW ROLE, NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

John Harbron

Our next speaker is Mr. Ukeru Magosaki, Minister at the Embassy of Japan in Ottawa

A graduate of Tokyo University, Mr. Magosaki is a career diplomat who has had a most diversified and interesting career. His assignments have included postings to the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Iraq, and to the United States, during which time he was a Fellow of the Harvard University Centre for International Affairs.

Mr. Magosaki has served extensively within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, holding positions in the Analysis Division, in the Treaties Division, the East European Division, Asian Bureau, Research and Policy Planning, and in the Minister's secretariat, among others.

Earlier in his career he was the Deputy Director of the Petroleum Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

He came to Canada early in 1989 following a three year tour as Minister-Counsellor at the Japanese Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.

Mr. Ukeru Magosaki

It is my great honour to speak about Japan at this seminar, sponsored by the prestigious Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Recently many questions about Japan have been asked by intellectuals of many nations, due to the increase of Japanese economic and financial power and its significant influence on the economy of other countries.

The questions are, for example:

- Why has Japan been successful in its economic performance, and can we expect the same kind of rapid growth for Japan in the future?; and
- Is Japan capable of co-operating with other Western countries? Is Japan not a country whose political, social and economic structures are different from Western countries and, therefore, might it not be difficult to find a situation for such co-operation?

Keeping in mind these questions, let me examine the Japanese future policy; first its political and military roles, and secondly, its economic policies.

In order to define the Japanese future role, the clear assessment of the environment for Japanese foreign policies is required. How can we characterize the recent international developments in comparison with the early 1980s, 70s, 60s or any other generation?

The most important characteristic of the dynamism of recent changes could be the fact that economic factors, particularly the international economic situation, have become the main concern for the governments of the major international players. Their recognition of the priority of economic reforms should be accompanied by changes in political and military postures if necessary.

In the old days, quite often military and political postures were defined and economic measures were sought to accommodate these postures. In many countries the priorities are now reversed. The order of internal economy is much more strongly recognized than before.

Although I am a layman to Canadian politics, and taking into consideration the existence of the delicate Canadian sentiment toward the United States, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement might have been different if you hadn't recognized your need for the restructuring of your industry in order to increase your competitiveness. It would also have been different if

there were no shift in the U.S. trade posture from multinational approaches to free trade systems to the increase of protectionist approaches.

Let us look at other countries. The most remarkable changes have happened in the Soviet Union. If there was no recognition of the devastating economic situation and of the necessity to take drastic economic measures in Russia, probably the Soviet Union might continue to control the Eastern European countries, and it might continue to build military power. Here diplomatic and military priorities have receded to economic necessity. The same could be said of the United States.

In the case of China, the situation differs. The Chinese recognized the necessity to modernize their economy, and at the same time they have no intention of allowing political change. Can they succeed in achieving the above two goals at the same time? Probably not. The probability of their failure to achieve the above goals is high due to the nature of modern industry. The essence of modern industry is mass participation in production. Without incentives and initiatives taken by the mass, it is very unlikely that any nation can achieve the industrial performance which is required to survive competition.

Recently I watched a Japanese TV programme about economic reforms in the Soviet Union. The programme featured two Soviet scholars seeking suggestions from American economists about how the USSR might succeed in modernizing its economy to an international level. One American economist bluntly said to the Soviet scholars that the chance for the USSR to succeed may be very small. She said, "Look at the U.S., look at the U.S. car industries. Modern technology was vigorously introduced. But we are losing competitiveness internationally. Even we Americans have difficulty. How does the Soviet Union, without experience and needed manpower, expect to survive high industrial competition?"

In this sense the Chinese option could be:

- to change current stances; or
- to keep current stances and allow the gap between industrialized countries and China to increase.

If the current situation continues, the second option is most likely. In this way, the economic weight of improper domestic policies has greatly increased. This has resulted in the increase of economic factors in bilateral and multilateral relations.

Mr. Gotlieb, your former Ambassador to the United States, illustrated this change in an article when he quoted Arnold Heeney's remark to the Prime Minister of the day that there were no important economic problems between the two North American neighbours in comparison with current extensive involvement in the multilateral economic fields.

In this political and economic environment, what has Japan achieved? As an example, let us look at Japanese influence in Asia.

Japanese foreign policies toward Asia have not shown particularly remarkable achievement by international standards. Nevertheless, the Japanese way of building its economy has had a great impact on neighbouring countries. After the Second World War, Japan shifted its main goal from being a military power to pursuing economic efficiency, although this shift was made not by choice, but rather by strong guidance from the United States. In the 1950s, 60s or early 1970s, nobody, including the Japanese, expected that the Japanese economic performance would attain such global significance.

One of the best ways to understand today's Japanese influence in Asian countries might be through an examination of hypothetical Asian situations in the late 1980s without Japan's existence; in other words, without Japanese economic performance after the Second World War. Probably there would be no economic prosperity to today's degree in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.

Furthermore, Japanese influence on these countries is partly accomplished by its direct contribution through trade and investment. It also was accomplished largely by presenting the Japanese model, without any conscientious effort on the side of the Japanese, just leaving initiatives to be taken by Asian neighbours. It is natural for Asian countries, with similar cultural backgrounds, to assume that they can perform just as the Japanese. Japanese influence is not limited to the above countries. The economic development encouraged the emergence of moderate groups in China and Vietnam. In this way the very existence of the Japanese model has contributed, without any Japanese intention, to prosperity and stability in the region.

Before discussing Japanese political roles in the future I would like to sum up what I've said to this point.

In the past, when we discussed international relations there was a tendency to separate political and military efforts from economic efforts. The key

persons involved in foreign affairs have usually put priority on political and military affairs.

Nevertheless, in recent years domestic economic situations have become the most important political issue for many countries which are major international players. Therefore any economic efforts which influence other countries should not be looked at only from the economic aspect, but also from the political aspect.

This has a great significance in the assessment of Japanese diplomacy of today and the future. Many observers regard Japan as a country which has only economic power, but not as a country which has exercised any significant political power. If we are not preoccupied with the past concepts, and if we are open to reality, probably Japan is now exercising a political role; not in the previous sense but in its influence on the domestic political situation.

Today, economic contributions to the Soviet Union are a most significant political action, if we pay attention to the internal policies of the USSR. In this sense, our economic relations with China and the East Asian countries have great political implications, although its recognition is limited. Even for our relations with Canada, whether Japanese investment can be carried out successfully has a political significance for you.

This assessment can be applied to the Middle East crisis. We are not sending any combat forces. Moreover, a Japanese law, which is intended to allow Japanese defence forces to be sent abroad under the umbrella of the UN, is facing difficulty in Parliament. I will explain why later.

People can criticize Japan for not contributing militarily. There is an international requirement, and sometimes the international community should act militarily. Unfortunately Japan is not, and probably will not, participate in this military action substantially. If people are interested only in military action, Japan is there to be criticized. But if we widen our scope of interpretation of international affairs, maybe there's another kind of interpretation.

The current Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has created at least two problems. One is: how shall we protect international principles? The question is, could we tolerate annexation of the country by military force? The other: how to limit possible damage by actions intended to honour an international principle. Currently, Egypt and Jordan are suffering. Could the Western countries be ready to accept the fall of the current governments of Egypt and Jordan? If we are not ready to see the collapse of the above two countries, how could

we save these countries? Probably the best way is to prevent economic disaster. The two billion dollars committed by the Japanese government to these countries will contribute to their stability.

In the future no single country can bring stability to any region. There is a need for co-operation. How do we form co-operation? A very simplistic way is to ask countries to follow a leader, most likely the United States. The contribution of each country is symmetrical to the leader. But is this the right approach? Let's look at Canada's contribution.

Has the Canadian contribution been symmetrical to the American effort? The answer is no. Canada's military contribution is limited, although your commitment to NATO and the UN has been appreciated. But you show your excellence in your contribution toward the peacekeeping forces and economic aid to developing countries. Thus, each country has its own strengths and weaknesses.

In the case of Japan, the strength is the economy, the weakness is military and physical power. Probably just as in football, we can formulate a way in which industrialized countries contribute to a common goal. A wide receiver can contribute to a winning game as a wide receiver, but if you expect him to function as a lineman your team will be destined to lose. But unfortunately in the current atmosphere of international co-operation people expect everyone to be a lineman.

Now I would like to look at the possibility of the effectiveness of Japanese political activities in the traditional sense. To make an assessment, three elements should be considered:

1. The eagerness on the Japanese side to take initiatives;
2. The areas where Japan can play a role; and
3. The nature of peace efforts in recent years.

As for the eagerness on the Japanese side to take political initiatives, there have been some positive changes in recent years. The Japanese government has started to state its own opinions clearly on political issues such as at the Economic Summit. In particular, the Japanese government has tried to state its views on desirable relations with China and the Far Eastern military situation. Regarding the Cambodian issue, the Japanese government has started to independently explore the possibility of peace in the area. Thus,

the Japanese effort to seek political stability will be increased, particularly in Asia.

The areas in Asia waiting for international co-operation are abundant: 1) the Korean peninsula; 2) Indochina; and 3) China, including the future of Hong Kong.

The final question is "Will Japan be successful?" Here I have some reservations. Nowadays, due to changes in international powers, it is very unlikely that any country can solve international problems independently, without co-operation with other countries.

In order to solve international problems, co-operation is required more than before. The most likely framework for co-operation is the United Nations. Apart from the UN it is not easy to create an effective framework for co-operation, particularly when opinions of the participating parties clash with each other. The centre of political manoeuvres at the UN is the Security Council. The Japanese position, not being a permanent Security Council member, limits scope for Japanese activities. The time has not come to welcome Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council. As long as reluctance to do so continues, the Japanese contribution will be limited.

Another element is the position of countries with which Japan is supposed to co-operate. If Japanese co-operation is successful, it should be based on close co-operation with other industrialized countries, particularly the United States. Does the United States welcome introducing other values in solving international problems? Or rather, will the U.S. stick to its own values while hoping that others will follow?

Probably the current U.S. position is the latter. If this is the case, Japan's initiatives, based on its own values, are unlikely to find great co-operation with the United States in the near future. If Japan starts to voice its own policy, the voice could be as follows: "The stark and inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our society by war. The best defence of peace is not power, but the removal of the cause of the war". This sentence is probably familiar to you. I have just quoted from Lester Pearson's memoirs. It seems strange, but our national feeling is very similar to Canada's, both in the political field and the economic field.

At the same time, many Asian countries remain sceptical or cautious of possible Japanese initiatives. Many countries prefer that Japan does not take any political initiatives. From past experience they are afraid of Japanese behaviour, fearing that in future Japan might dominate Asia.

Thus, in the near future, the international environment may not yet be ready to welcome Japanese initiatives based on its own values. As for diplomatic efforts in Asia, let me speak of the security situation in that region.

The security situation in Northern Asia is very fragile due to several factors such as the existence of hostility between neighbouring countries at one time or another. For example, the relationship between China and the USSR, Japan and the USSR, South and North Korea, China and Vietnam have all experienced a tendency to escalate to physical conflict and unstable domestic political situations.

How do we approach these fragile areas? The points to be understood are as follows:

- Contrary to the European situation, the agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the retreat of the Soviet forces from Eastern Europe doesn't necessarily bring peace to the East Asian region;
- Each hostility has its own origins and causes. It is not easy to find comprehensive principles which can be applied to all conflicts;
- Hostilities among the concerned countries are high, therefore the mere creation of the frameworks for dialogue will likely fail to produce positive results, as shown in the case of the Korean Peninsula in the past. The groundwork to reduce hostility, such as the increase of human contact and economic exchanges must still be laid.

Let us look at the Japanese performance in military actions in the future. After the War, the elimination of the Japanese and German military strength was considered to be the major objective of Allied countries. The Constitution was introduced to prohibit military forces. Education and mass media were fully organized to convince the Japanese public that use of military power in an international framework was wrong.

The change of the international climate, of strategic weapons, and of the roles expected to be played in strategic games have changed our defence postures. The government has adjusted to the changes of the international scenarios and requirements. But the Japanese public as a whole started to believe that peace is most precious, and that peace can be achieved not by physical force but by peaceful means. Many people may criticize this perception as being naive. As a result, the government began to think that Japan should play some military role in the future in order to maintain peace and

order. But if the above "naive" concepts can work, this new idea will go down in history!

Now may I make a few remarks about the Japanese economy? Probably the major interest for you is whether the Japanese economy can show strength in comparison with other nations. Some may have doubts about Japan's future, and one basis for this doubt is as follows: in the past Japan has borrowed technology originally created in Western countries. They have some doubt in the Japanese ability to lead new technology. Probably they can be partly justified.

If you are interested in Japanese society as such, the best book is probably *The Japanese and the Jews.* The first English edition was published in 1972. In this book the author makes a comparison between Japanese and Western society. He speaks about what consensus and originality mean to the Japanese.

For over 2,000 years the Japanese have cultivated rice; that has been the major occupation for more than 90 percent of the Japanese. The climate has been almost the same all these years: spring is the rainy season, summer is very hot so that the rice field requires watering, and fall is the typhoon season. The weather changes rapidly and to cope with these changes a collective effort is required. If some young fellow might start to state his original opinion that planting rice might be better a week earlier or later – is he right? Probably not, because common knowledge is an accumulation of the past history. Furthermore, his behaviour might deteriorate the basis for joint action. In this way originality has less appeal, and could be considered a nuisance. This tendency still continues to exist in Japan.

On the other hand, what does "consensus" mean to Westerners? For the fox hunt, there might exist a consensus that a fox will come from the north. One peculiar person might say that a fox will come from the south. If a fox comes from the south the consensus doesn't mean anything. In this way, in Western tradition, there is a tendency to welcome originality.

Thus if you see Japanese leaders of political, business or academic circles, you will be surprised by their relative commonplaceness and you start to wonder how Japan can succeed with these commonplace leaders. The answer to this question lies in the character of modern society.

Once a military expert gave a lecture mentioning that in order to produce a pin, about 1,000 professions are involved. When you consider creating a good pin, you may think about the designer, or a metallurgist. But without

good co-operation of the other 998 professionals, you cannot produce good pins all the time.

Thus Japan may suffer from a relative weakness of leaders, but enjoy a high quality of the masses, and usually any scientific invention is the result of collective work over three or four years. Thus, as long as collective work in the scientific and industrial fields are needed, Japan can survive competition.

The nature of the Japanese so-called closed market is the key agenda item for Japan-U.S. negotiations. At the same time, the trade friction has other causes, such as a persistent trade deficit and U.S. pessimism on the future prospects for the competitiveness of their industry and society as a whole. The issue, therefore, has both substantial and emotional elements. As long as the U.S. emotional element continues, the U.S.-Japan economic friction cannot be easily removed.

I clearly understand that the points which I have made have many aspects to be examined. But if I made any contribution to enlighten you to examine the concepts generally held among the public, I would be delighted.

GERALD CAPLAN

CANADA'S CHANGING DIMENSION: POLITICS AND STRATEGY

John Harbron

Our next speaker, Mr. Gerald Caplan, is familiar to a lot of you. He is a media commentator and public speaker on Canadian, American, and international affairs, appearing regularly on the political panel of CTV's *Canada AM,* and writing a syndicated political column for the Toronto Star. He has written numerous books and articles on a variety of subjects, including history and politics in Canada and Africa, underdevelopment in the Third World, American foreign policy, economics, the environment, and broadcasting.

Mr. Caplan holds a B.A. and an M.A. in Canadian History from the University of Toronto, and holds a doctorate in African Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. He has worked as a researcher and lecturer at the University of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and later at the Rhodes-Livingston Institute in Lusaka in Zambia. He has taught history at the University of Toronto, and in the Department of History and Philosophy of Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.

In the late 1970s Mr. Caplan was the Director of the Canadian University Science Overseas Program in Nigeria. He co-chaired the Federal Government Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, and has had extensive involvement with the New Democratic Party at both the federal and provincial levels; he was the National Director of the New Democratic Party and is currently an information advisor to the Premier of Ontario.

Mr. Caplan has written books, articles, columns and book reviews in the fields of Canadian History, politics, education, political socialization, African history and politics, Third World underdevelopment, public health, broadcasting, the environment, American foreign policy, and economics.

He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Public Policy Forum, Inter Pares, the Canadian Stage Company, and the Friends of Canadian Broadcasting.

Gerald Caplan

Thank you. I'm honoured to be here. I'm pleased to follow the elegant and civilized address by Mr. Magosaki.

My topic is very broad. When Alex Morrison called and prevailed on me to join you this morning I said "I don't know very much about any of this, Alex". He said, "It doesn't stop you from writing your columns on it all the time." I said, "Yes, but Alex, we in the New Democratic Party are in the opposition, we don't have to know what we're talking about."

Well since then, of course, strange things have happened in our land, since the New Democratic Party was elected to form the Government of Ontario with Bob Rae as the Premier, and I cannot be quite as reckless and irresponsible as I wanted to be, and as I would have been, say, on September 5, to pick a date at random. But I will try to live up to a certain reputation here – it's not that hard to do.

I want to get some thoughts that I've long had off my chest; since I have this forum and no one can beat me up until I'm finished, I guess this is the time to do it.

A country's foreign policy ought to be based on its interests. That seems to me a hard-headed proposition that people of whatever ideology can agree on. The question is, what are our interests? And on that there will be substantial lack of agreement.

I make two major premises here. One is that we are not about to be attacked by anyone, and therefore a foreign policy that is required to prepare for an attack is not necessary for Canada. Secondly, I make the assertion that we have no territorial ambitions to pursue, and therefore that kind of activity doesn't seem to be necessary.

So what is necessary? Well, let me use the same cliché that Mr. Magosaki used, and he felt the same embarrassment about it as I do. It is a comment on our times that people who talk about peace are self-conscious about it, since it's so much easier and much more fun to talk about bellicosity and war. But his quote from Lester Pearson about war being no solution to anything, and a good foreign policy for Canada being about preventing war doesn't seem to me the silliest thing anybody's ever said, even though it's a long way from happening.

So I'd say a peaceful and prosperous world would be a pretty good aim. Usually we only talk like that at Christmas time, but I think if we did it a couple of more months a year maybe we'd get somewhere.

In fact, of course, the real major foreign policy that Canada has is its bilateral relations with the United States. I don't propose to discuss that today, but that is the central truth of this country. That's why the Free Trade deal was in fact the most important foreign policy initiative of Canada for many, many years. But, as I say, I want to leave that for the moment and talk about more conventional aspects of foreign policy.

The first is the United States in non-bilateral terms. It's how Canada relates to American adventures abroad that we have to consider as a number one priority. Secondly, how we function in terms of the Third World – that is often connected since, in my view, the United States is the single greatest threat to peace and development and stability in the Third World, which colours our activities a great deal. Thirdly, there are the more conventional coastal and border problems that all countries have. Alexa McDonough, my colleague in Nova Scotia who will probably soon be premier in that province, tells me that she worries a lot about foreign fishing vessels. Well, I have to tell you, it worries me considerably less since I don't live in the Atlantic provinces. But one would have to worry about that, and one has to worry about drugs coming in over borders, and one has to worry about illegal refugees. I will not concentrate on any of those issues this morning.

I want to tell you what, in my view, the non-interests of Canada are.

The first non-interest of Canada – let's get to the heart of it – is NATO. NATO has been the major defence activity of Canada for four decades, which is why it has to be central to any discussion such as this, although it has always only been a marginal issue in Canadian political terms, and we have only ever had a peripheral, if not negligible, role in it. Nevertheless, it has been our central foreign policy thrust.

Let's ignore divisive questions about what the realities were about Soviet expansionism and Soviet aggression outside Eastern Europe after 1949. Let's ignore the divisive issue of whether, over all these years, the Warsaw Pact really was this mighty, menacing machine that could pulverize NATO any given half-hour of the day. Let's ignore those kinds of things and talk about things we all agree on, such as the continuing utility of NATO.

We can agree on some things. We can agree that Europe has rather lost its centrality as the major battlefield of the Cold War. We can recognize that through the 80s, all across the United States at least, if not in Canada, national security thinkers were increasingly emphasizing the marginalization of Europe as a central theatre for the Cold War to be fought on. Ironically, many of the people who were pushing that argument were on the far Reaganite right of American politics. They had a different agenda. Their agenda was confronting the Third World, but the reason they came to it is because they understood that Europe was not the issue any longer.Let me quote from some of them. This is a 1983 study prepared for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, titled "Low-Intensity Conflict." In this study the author described extended conventional superpower hostilities in Europe as "the conflict least likely to occur."

A little later, Lieutenant-General Samuel Wilson, who had been the head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, said there is little likelihood of a strategic nuclear confrontation with the Soviets, or that Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces will come tearing through the Fulda Gap into West Germany in a conventional thrust. Another student of low-intensity conflicts, another colonel, wrote in 1985 that the U.S. army is still preparing for the wrong war by emphasizing the Soviet threat and the plains of Europe.

And then a year later, in 1986, the Pentagon and the National Security Council established a joint Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy for the United States. There was not a single "pinko" or peacemonger on it. In fact it was chaired, or co-chaired by the Undersecretary-of-Defence, Fred Ikle, who is a hawkish anti-communist. Henry Kissinger was a co-chairman. Zbignew Brzezinski, whose only aim in life is to be more hawkish than Kissinger, was on it. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was on it. And in their reports, they proposed that the U.S. adjust its military strategy in view of a changing security environment in the decades ahead. The report also challenged NATO's basic conventional premises, downplayed the idea of a

massive Warsaw Pact attack on central Europe or an all-out Soviet nuclear attack and described them as unlikely to occur.

Their predictions were borne out by the events of the last year, the culmination of which was the triumphant NATO summit in London this summer. I happened to be there at the time and the announcement was sent out loud and clear: the Cold War is dead. All kinds of people said it.

The Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, set the seal on the end of the Cold War by going to Moscow shortly after the summit for unprecedented talks with President Gorbachev. The latter, in turn, accepted an invitation to NATO headquarters in Brussels. Some of you may remember in that wonderful film, *Doctor Strangelove,* these people visiting each other's chambers, but in rather less amiable circumstances.

"I told President Gorbachev," Woerner later told reporters, "we trust you and you can trust us. My personal message was that our alliance does not look upon you as an adversary, but as a future partner." The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Joe Clark recently echoed Woerner's thoughts: "We need new directions for NATO. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany."

Henry Dodd, editor of Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, came to Canada recently and his speech was reproduced in the Financial Post. He began as follows: "Now that peace has broken out all over Europe, now that the two Germanies are one, now that we realize that the Soviets are really quite nice people, surely it's time to abandon that outdated alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Well, guess what? Notwithstanding these statements and the fact that every single purpose of NATO has now explicitly been said to be ended, it appears we cannot give up the institution.

The Prime Minister himself, at the London Summit, couldn't get over the thrill that the Cold War was over and kept telling reporters how ecstatic he was. Yet he added, Canadian troops won't be withdrawn from Europe. He said, "It's difficult to foresee the absence of Canadian troops in the foreseeable future."

And the same Henry Dodd, answering his own question, "Can we afford to end NATO?", said – guess what? "Despite dramatic social change in the past year there is still scope for major instability in Eastern Europe in general and in the Soviet Union in particular. Until all these countries have achieved

some form of stability, it can't be guaranteed that NATO forces won't be needed in one role or another, possibly even as a peacekeeping force."

NATO will be moving into Yugoslavia, I take it, to separate Serbians and the others very quickly.

NATO itself said, in its declaration last summer, that the Warsaw Pact is no longer an adversary. Not only no longer an adversary, most countries in the Warsaw Pact, as you know, can barely walk a straight line these days. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué said this: "Nuclear arms will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted."

Well, for someone who's quite as old as I am, growing up understanding that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter the Soviet invasion of the rest of the world, it all boggles the mind. And while the status quo is being insisted on by some countries, others are going ahead perpetuating what can only be called massive military preparations.

I talk first of France, where my socialist colleagues have, as they have from the beginning, put traditional French chauvinism way ahead of any ideology that should pertain to something called socialism. Then there's Mrs. Thatcher, who has never seen a war she did not want to participate in. Both of them are refusing to abandon a single aspect of their longstanding nuclear plans. Indeed, if the Channel Tunnel doesn't work you'll be pleased to know that there are joint developments of new weapons system going on between France and Britain. It surely gives one cause for relief.

Let me finally give you the *pièce de résistance* on these wonderful quotations. It is the policy of the Canadian government, ladies and gentlemen; you'll have to listen carefully.

In 1987 the government presented a White Paper. Mr. Beatty was then the Defence Minister. In the White Paper of 1987 our government said on your and my behalf as follows. (This, by the way, was two years after Gorbachev took over.) "The principle direct threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union."

1989: "The most serious direct threat to Canada is a Soviet nuclear attack on North America."

1990: "The most serious direct threat to Canada is a Soviet nuclear attack on North America."

In a sensible world you would have thought that something ought to change. In a sensible world you would have thought that since every single premise has now collapsed, since every single threat we all grew up learning was what we were defending and armirg ourselves against, since every single one – without a single exception – has now collapsed, you would think that something might change in Western policy. I am pleased to reassure you that nothing whatsoever is going to change and we will have NATO to kick around for a long time to come.

I would like to spend the next couple of hours talking about the role of NATO and the Canadian government in bringing new progress to the Innu of Newfoundland and Labrador, but I won't. Let me instead show how the fate of NATO has directly touched the fate of the "peace dividend" that ignorant people like me and some others thought might be an outcome of the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet empire.

In fact, all over the world, particularly in the United States, there are people who thank God every moment of the day for Saddam Hussein. His timely intervention has saved us from ourselves. These are people in the Pentagon, major defence contractors in the United States, lobbyists – most of them retired generals, the universities in that country who get money from the Pentagon, all those other think tanks, are indebted, morning, noon and night to Hussein and his timely intervention in the Gulf. Without him, in fact, the pressure to cut the American budget might have been substantial. He has saved us that embarrassment. Only a few weeks ago Congress passed the final budget for the United States Defence, and it is US $288 billion, only trivially less than it would have been in the heat of the Cold War. Just to translate it into Canadian terms, that's a third of a trillion Canadian dollars.

In fact the Gulf Crisis became the excuse in Congress and all across the United States to protect any number of weapons systems of dubious military value because some Pentagon general or some contractor needed it, or some state needed it in order to keep employment up. The B-2 Stealth bomber is a good example of that. All the Stealth weapons are ultimately offensive weapons.

It is problematic for Canada that our best friends in the world, the United States and Britain, are living still in this "Strangelovian" world of the Cold War, notwithstanding the death of the Cold War. The United States still has an arsenal of no fewer than 12,000 nuclear warheads aimed directly at targets in the Soviet Union. According to the best strategists, if only a third of them got

through, every centre over 25,000 – we're talking cities here – in the entire Soviet Union would be pulverized. I guess it's become complicated now since most of them want to be independent and secede from the Soviet Union, but I don't think they're going to be let off yet.

Pentagon strategy, however, remains, notwithstanding the fact that everything has changed, to obliterate every Soviet military and industrial target in the Soviet Union; all capacity of any kind. So the United States arms control negotiators have time after time rejected Soviet proposals for dramatic cuts in each other's warheads. In fact the United States continues to build fast, accurate, modernized missiles and aircraft that the Soviet Union will have little choice but to view as first-strike threats. And even American hardliners think it's crazy – once they're out of government. Paul Nitze, who has negotiated any number of partial, tough arms control agreements for the United States, believes that 3,000 warheads would more than do – they have 12,000. And former Defence Secretary Harold Brown, the Carter Defence Secretary, never known as a dove, believes that 1,000 would do – but we have 12,000. It never ends.

Let me tell you something else. The United States refuses to agree to a ban on underground nuclear testing, notwithstanding the famous end of the Cold War, and you'll be proud to know that Canada, or at least the Canadian government, is on this, as in all other issues, completely on side with the United States.

You'll remember that in the 60s the nuclear powers agreed to ban tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space. But they left the huge loophole of underground testing, and naturally the then-nuclear powers rushed to fill that loophole and in a furious pace raced to develop ever-more-fearsome weapons through testing. At the moment there is a worldwide campaign to close that loophole, to ban all further underground testing. And I want to tell you that among the very few countries in the world that are opposed to it are the United States, who is doing it, and Canada, and Britain.

In my view a total ban remains as important now as it has been over the decades as a step along the way to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which I always thought was supposed to be a Canadian goal. Already, of course, the number of countries who have some nuclear capacity, or some incipient nuclear capacity, is terribly, terribly frightening. It is everyone from Argentina to Pakistan to Israel to South Africa, and all tests make it easier to spread new weapons.

Similarly, we are still agreeing to test cruise missiles on behalf of the United States. Just this morning you will have heard the good news that yesterday's cruise test did not work properly and for the third time in a row it was aborted. Well, a little bit of good news doesn't hurt from time to time. Nevertheless we are stuck in this bizarre Cold War time warp where we are testing a radar-evading Stealth cruise missile whose purpose explicitly is to attack the Soviet Union without radar being able to find it. And we are still doing it.

In 1983 when then-Prime Minister Trudeau agreed to these kinds of tests it was with the qualification (which seemed to me spurious even at the time) that the tests must never conflict with arms control goals. It seemed to me they always conflicted with arms control goals. It was disingenuous then, it is completely hypocritical now. It seems to have little or nothing to do with Canadian security, or world security. It remains another provocative and offensive act by our side, which we support, and it is entirely gratuitous.

Alex Morrison asked me to talk about what, realistically, we can expect Canada to contribute to international peace, security and stability. I don't know what "realistic" means. People who talk about peace, as I already said, are dismissed as naive, and as people who don't know how the world is, so let me talk naively for a moment.

We can do the following things:

- we can refuse to participate in and perpetuate the myths and structures of the Cold War that still, regardless of all the fancy statements out of the summit in July, prevail -- NATO, NORAD, the rhetoric, all the rest;
- we can move back to our traditional, proud Canadian role of pushing disarmament, which we cannot do so long as we are complicit in rearmament;
- we can refuse to be mindless, lapdog allies of the United States in its Third World adventurism. I will come back to that in a moment;
- we can increase our aid and our trade and our support for the best countries in the Third World;
- in Europe: I say we get out; I say the United States gets out, and I say that our role is to promote that which is already happening in Europe and in which we have no role. That is, the security arrangements that are being lumped under the rubric of CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is to involve Western na-

> tions, Eastern nations, neutral nations, in a series of integrated structures at both the political and military levels. That's the way you have peace and stability in Europe, and we have no useful role there, and neither do the Americans;
>
> the UN and peacekeeping. Again, does one retreat? You see – every time I say it I feel awkward about it. Are the naive, innocent good old Pearsonian days of Canada as a peacekeeper over? Well, I think it remains an honourable way for us to function.

The Gulf Crisis seems to me the perfect example of how not to operate in the post-Cold War world. First, there's the terrible, terrible double standard, which outrages me, that says that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, which is deplorable, is more deplorable than the invasions of Panama, or of Grenada, or of Nicaragua, or of the destabilizations of Chile, or of Jamaica. In fact I see the distinction: the distinction is that the United States has been the culprit in the other ones and some easy-to-hate Arab dictator is the culprit this time. It seems unacceptable. All invasions and aggressions should be stopped.

Secondly, Mr. Mulroney and Mr. Clark have functioned in this crisis not as rulers of an independent country, but more as governors of American states. Our policy is not following a UN policy, it is following a U.S. policy. Each of the major moves that Canada has taken in the Gulf Crisis has followed direct discussion between Brian Mulroney and George Bush. In fact the two major steps came literally hours after Mulroney left George Bush. It does not seem right. It seems to me that the United Nations is still the right forum for Canada, not the United States.

Related to that, surely even those who will disagree with many of my basic premises, ought to agree that a military adventure or movement by Canada, with strategic objectives that have never been discussed, that have never been related to us, is not the way Canada should function.

And finally under the question of how the Gulf Crisis ought to be handled, I am with those innocents and naifs around the world who believe that prevention is not impossible. I see a world of probably endless regional conflicts. Most of them will be, naturally, in the Third World. A number of them will now be in Eastern Europe. They will be conflicts over resources, or over religion, or nationality, or ethnicity, or just because crazy people sometimes

start wars. Not all of them will be preventable, but some of them will be, if we can try to minimize them through some kind of United Nations pre-planning – it's not pie in the sky. Well, I don't care – if it is pie in the sky it's worth trying for because we have nothing to lose and everything to gain. To make peacekeeping a regular part of UN work, not ad hoc, not just reacting to tomorrow's horrible crisis, through a system of manpower, training, financing and logistics, seems a plausible and honourable thing to do.

There have been 18 UN peacekeeping operations over the years. We've been involved in all but one of them, and yet, here in the Gulf, we make ourselves part of an American operation. There is a real peace dividend, thanks to the Cold War's ending, thanks to the objective disintegration of old animosities and old pathologies, and the peace dividend is a plausible way of working together to minimize future conflicts.

Alex asked me to address one final issue. Does the question of power, now that the New Democratic Party (NDP) has touched it in Ontario at least, change one's view of international realities? One could go further – if there were an election today there is at least a chance that Audrey McLaughlin would emerge with the largest number of seats in what I guess would be a five-party or six-party House of Commons. So it's an issue that I take seriously.

If you read today's paper you would see that what the Toronto Star called the "flip-flop" by the Ontario government on the question of British Gas buying Consumer's Gas was the first story, and the second was a "flip-flop" on the party's policy for rent review. Well, it happens in government.

Mr. Rae, in his swearing-in speech said "We will make mistakes." His tense was wrong. You make mistakes when you're in the opposition because you say things that are easy and you don't have enough knowledge. The question I tested myself on, thanks to Alex pressing me, is whether everything I'm saying would be reversed by an NDP government when it got into power in Ottawa because, as with British Gas and Rent Review, you'd find that it's all easy to say something in opposition but you simply can't do it.

Well I don't know. I begin by saying frankly, and I hope I always do, that there's no doubt that an NDP government would understand the other side rather more thoughtfully than we do, and I do, at the moment. There's no doubt that this kind of extra understanding exists. But I can't think that a single thing that I've said would make less sense if I were in a position to do it than it does now where I'm in a position only to talk about it.

Let me tell you what I think is the greatest constraint to the NDP, or to me, or to anyone carrying out the kind of programme I suggest – and that's whether Washington would let us do it. If that sounds like left-wing paranoia, it is not left-wing paranoia. Ask Prime Minister Gough Whitlam who was peremptorily thrown out of office in Australia. Ask parties on the left in Italy where, even in recent years, CIA money has been funnelled to conservative parties. I don't mean to speak specifically but I know other people in Jamaica than our speaker today. Ask them what happened under the Manley government.

I don't know how far we would be allowed to do these things, there are constraints in the world. But what can I do? I can't deal with that yet. All I can tell you is what those things are that seem to me to fit into a sensible Canadian foreign policy, to make the world a little more peaceable, to make the world a little more stable, and to make the world a little more prosperous. It does not seem to me an ignoble objective.

FORUM

Don Campbell, Chairman, Strategic Studies Group, Progressive Conservative Blue Chip Club

Mr. Caplan, Canada is a very large country – 60 percent of the landmass is accessible only by air, yet we only have 1,000 airborne troops. The NDP is the party that professes a concern for Canadian sovereignty, but Canada lacks the instruments to assert and enforce our sovereignty, for example: the Polar 8-Icebreaker; nuclear-powered submarines; and air surveillance over our Arctic Islands. These things are expensive. Yet Canada can afford to give foreign aid to countries like India that can afford the nuclear-powered submarines, an indigenous tank programme, three different indigenous missile programmes, naval infantry, and so forth. And one last point of information: there are about 60 countries in the world that have marines or naval infantry, yet Canada, with the longest coastline in the world, doesn't have any marines or naval infantry at all, and indeed, we need them. Now this, in a nutshell, illustrates the predicament of Canadian defence: the three major parties for a good 30 years have neglected our defence effort.

So my point is this. For the New Democratic Party to profess concern for Canadian sovereignty, is it or is it not just a lot of hot air when you are not willing to purchase the instruments of Canadian sovereignty to ensure that we do not become a protectorate of the United States?

Mr. Caplan

You will be surprised to know that I agree with you about your proposition. I think that the size of the arms budgets of many Third World countries, including the very poorest, is scandalous and outrageous, and I think it is unacceptable. If the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank stopped trying to push around all those countries by imposing neo-conservative market economic policies on them and tried to push them to stop increasing their military budgets, that would be a very major move for peace. So we agree entirely.

We don't agree quite as much on the other stuff, because I don't understand what you think the Northern icebreaker, or a fleet of nuclear submarines would do. I don't understand who they're going to save us from. I personally don't believe anybody's coming over the North to get us. We have had a problem with American submarines, of course, in Canadian territorial waters. And I think if we had nuclear subs we'd be able to give them tickets and run like hell. So I'm not sure that I've ever thought that to spend money on those subs made very much sense.

You'll be reassured to know that, in the six years of the Mulroney government, the largest single increase, if memory serves, in all the budgetary expenses were for defence. So you should be very happy with the Conservatives.

Michael Murray, University of Toronto

Mr. Magosaki, part of the problem that's preventing the establishment of a CSCE type system in the North Pacific has been the conflicting territorial claims. Japan has had some problems with the Soviet Union over Japan's northern territories and islands which were claimed by the Soviets after the war. Is Japan willing to negotiate or to reduce some of its claims in order to promote regional co-operation in a CSCE type arrangement?

Mr. Magosaki

I think I mentioned that the regional problems in the Far East are very complicated, and probably we cannot settle all problems by one single principle. For example, dealing with the Soviet Union requires the application of different kinds of principles. Historically it's different; the islands have a different historical background, therefore it's very difficult to find the solution in a CSCE type of negotiation. For example, the CSCE negotiation calls for a recognition of the current status quo in Europe. Japan will not accept this type of negotiation.

Thomas Weller, Ryerson Polytechnical Institute

Mr. Anderson, you addressed the dilemma about progress in developing countries partly because of huge debt loads. In the past year the major industrial powers have agreed to give substantial aid to Eastern Europe, not just in handouts, but also, in long-term business investments and industries.

Now, of course this is very good and I'm glad to be part of this, being Canadian. But why is there not any comparable aid for the Caribbean and Latin American countries?

Is there a solution, or are countries like yours forever going to go on struggling? When do you think the time will finally come when countries like mine, Canada, will find it a priority to help a country like yours? Does something major like a revolution have to happen?

Now, I know Canadians are not stingy – we gave millions of dollars in aid when the huge hurricane came through a few years ago, but I don't really think giving aid is one of the solutions.

So basically my question is what will it take for Western developed countries to start investing in Less Developed Countries in a serious way?

Mr. Anderson

An excellent question that would require an extremely long answer. But to preface my answer, I must say that Canada has been very, very generous

and co-operative in its foreign aid assistance to my country, and I want to pause for half a second for emphasis on that – extremely generous, not just in terms of natural disasters, but over time. CIDA, the overseas development assistance programme has been very useful, very constructive and substantial in terms of the Canadian capacity to assist in those ways.

Let me say, too, that Canada, but more specifically the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, recognize that there is another dimension to aid which is in fact investment. What is very often called "aid" is in fact investment, in which the recipient country benefits and the donor country benefits. That point has been made and I think it should continue to be made.

But I hope I didn't paint too gloomy a picture of developing countries. I was going to develop a response later on and I'm glad you've given me the opportunity to do so.

We recognize that we have to be competitive. Investment, production, export; these are the keys to our economic survival. In order to export we have to do it very effectively; we need to do it competitively. We are adopting very modern programmes of using improved technology, we are being selective in what we choose to export, we are not depending as much on the traditional sugar and rum, although those remain very important. But we have to be there at the cutting edge of technology. We are into electronics, telecommunications, data processing, and so on. We have proven to be quite competitive, working with new partners and working assiduously to find new markets. And we have a very, very crucial factor here and that is the presence of Jamaicans – of Canadians of Jamaican origin – in this country, who are well-equipped to make a contribution in terms of export, in terms of technology transfer; a contribution to Jamaica, and to Canada at the same time. It's a resource that I'm sure Canada will want to develop in the delivery of what it does in Jamaica and its investment in Jamaica. We would want to develop that resource as well.

Also, I suppose that you here who are sensitized to the needs of developing countries and are sensitized to the interdependence of developed and developing countries will also make your voices heard and will also act, as our lead speaker this morning says. You devise your strategy, you have your ideas, and then act in order to try to address some of the problems in developing countries.

May I add just one other point. We, for decades in Jamaica, have recognized that in order for us as a country, and for developing countries, to progress, we need to co-operate more amongst ourselves, to recognize our compatibilities, our strengths – of course we know our weaknesses – and utilize them in such a structured and effective way as to benefit ourselves as a group. The potential for developing that is vast.

At the same time that we're doing that, we must use these same resources, not material resources, to develop and try to restructure our relationship with the North, because we cannot exist on our own. The North cannot exist on its own either. We have to recognize our interdependence and that, in the environment or drugs or whatever else, we progress together or we in fact go under together.

Professor Joel Sokolsky, Royal Military College of Canada

Mr. Caplan, it seems to me that critics of Canada's NATO and allied posture are living in the past if they believe that our allies will exert significant pressure on us either to remain in Europe or remain actively engaged. One of the things that's changing, it seems to me, is that Canada can withdraw from NATO, can take its troops out of Europe, and can adopt a lower profile in terms of North American defence because the interests of our allies now dictate that the Canadian contribution is less significant. I think in the future we'll probably be able to have the type of independent policy that the NDP has advocated, but that really no one will care that much.

Mr. Caplan

It's good to know that when nobody gives a damn Canada can do what's right. What can I say? I'm glad to hear that and in that case there's no excuse for us not doing it in the next few months.

John Weber, General Electric Canada

Mr. Caplan, I'm glad to see that true to form you've dismissed all the relevant facts and carried on with the typical NDP rhetoric. You would have disappointed me otherwise.

I would like to know what you or your colleagues would propose to say to Kuwaitis who have been routed from their homes, executed, their property confiscated, and with no hope of any wonderful person running around waving a Canadian flag saying "Let's all vote for peace."

I would like to know what you would respond to those people who are the victims of this injustice. And please, if you would, focus on that issue rather than digressing into other situations that may or may not be relevant to this issue.

Mr. Caplan

No, no – your sense of relevance is not the same as mine, John. I abhor and despise the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait as much as you or the Prime Minister, or George Bush. But I also despise all the other invasions by big countries of small countries, and if we're going to do something about one let's do something about all. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has asked for the capacity in the UN to have a permanent peacekeeping force available – not an ad hoc one but a permanent one to be part of the UN structure – to be used when necessary as necessary.

I don't know if it's going to work but I want to tell you that it will do as much for those poor Kuwaitis you were worrying about as anything we're going to do. We are in a position to be part of one of the bloodiest wars we've had in 50 years. There are 900,000 troops – or there soon will be – 900,000 fully-armed troops in the Mid-East, all ready for a war against each other. It will be carnage! So if you think that that's the best way to help those Kuwaitis, if you think that that's the best way to help all the civilians that are going to get massacred, if you think that's the best way to help the 1700 Canadians whom we have sent over for whatever reason, or the 300,000 Americans, or the 490,000 Iraqis, all of whom are armed to the teeth with the most modern weapons – well, good for you! I want to be more cautious about it. The

answer is that we have for the first time almost in history imposed a genuine international embargo on a single country and if we are now not going to give it time to work, on what grounds? On the grounds that Saddam Hussein's going to invade Saudi Arabia? No, he's not going to invade Saudi, we know that already. That there's going to be increasing bloodshed? No there's not. That there are 40 Canadian hostages? On what grounds will we not wait patiently to make sure that economic sanctions bite when all kinds of experts say if we give it the time it will work. But I want to tell you that George Bush, who's low in the polls, and Maggie Thatcher, who needs another Falklands because she's low in the polls, don't want to wait for their political reasons, and I say again, we should have no part in it.

JEREMY KINSMAN

THE GULF: WAR OR PEACE? LUNCHEON ADDRESS

Don Macnamara

Mr. Jeremy Kinsman, our luncheon speaker today is, in the Department of External Affairs, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Political and International Security Affairs and he comes to us from a series of appointments, both within and outside the Department that puts him in a very good position to speak on the subject of international security today.

A graduate of Princeton University and L'Institut de les Etudes Politiques in Paris, Mr. Kinsman joined the Department of External Affairs in 1966 following a year with the Aluminum Company of Canada. He has served at the Canadian Embassy in Algiers, at the European Economic Community in Brussels, and as a member of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. His most recent posting was as the Minister for Political Affairs in the Canadian Embassy in Washington, from 1985 to 1989.

At home, Mr. Kinsman was chairman of the Policy Planning Secretariat in Ottawa, and he served for a period of time as the Assistant Deputy Minister of Cultural Affairs and Broadcasting in the Department of Communications. Last summer he returned to the Department of External Affairs in his current appointment.

Mr. Jeremy Kinsman

Before I talk about the Gulf I would like to spend a couple of minutes o
Canadian Security Policy for the 90s.

To give you a context, the Department of External Affairs has been redefi
ing our security policy in concert with the Department of National Defenc
I would emphasize that the project draws its energy from the end of the Co
War, which has been the organizing principle of international life for the la
45 years. With its end, we are trying to redefine what Canada's military tas
are going to be.

Please bear in mind that Canada has already had its peace dividend
heard a very intelligent speaker asking a question which inferred that th
morning. We don't have a lot of money to be redirected from defen
programmes toward other programmes. In fact, what we have to do is
reconsolidate what we've got around our interests.

First and foremost of those interests, of course, is Canadian sovereign
We've got to find a way to redefine the Canadian military personality or voc
tion in line with sovereignty. The other fundamental aspect of Canadi
security policy, and the one that is the most revered, of Canada's vocatio
internationally, is the search for world order, for shared risk, which has be
the context for much of Canadian military effort since the Second World W
And as we move away from the kind of collective security arrangements t
we knew under the Cold War toward the co-operative security arrangeme
that we'll know for the rest of the 90s, I suppose that we're starting with
sudden revelation that occurred this summer over the Gulf: that the wo
that we had thought had become less dangerous and more comfortal
had suddenly become more dangerous and less comfortable – certainly l
predictable. How we define our involvement in that is of course going to
the object of the review within both External Affairs and National Defenc

But we are looking for a new definition of security, a definition of secu
which is rooted in the regions, which involves voluntary regional co-ope
tion. The definition will have to take into account that security for Canad
a world context is just as apt in the 90s and in the next century to take
count of ecological factors, social factors, movements of peoples, dem
raphy, refugees, obviously the fundamentals of economic tensi
Increasingly, these things are as important as our military factors in the
we protect our security interests. That is the interesting aspect of the CS

whose summit takes place the week after next in Paris. It is regional, it is what Vaclev Havel (the recently elected President of Czechoslovakia) calls pluralist. That is what enables countries such as ours, the Soviet Union and other countries with vastly diverse peoples to try to find accommodation within a larger framework; and which can deal with tension in a real way.

Let me now move to the Gulf. What I plan to do is just take a look at the crisis, take a look at what the stakes are and what the odds are, and I'll do this as candidly and as frankly as I can.

First of all bear in mind the time at which this crisis has occurred. It's a very special time in the world. For the last 45 years the world has lived under the suspended sword of the Cold War. What the Gulf Crisis has done is bring an end to our belief that the world was going to be an easier place. The crisis has also challenged the institutions which were created out of the wreckage of the Second World War to show that, in fact, this first time in history that they've actually had any chance of being used they could cope with threats to peace and security effectively. So it's a special time.

Second, it's a special place. The Middle East, as every strategist has known for 30 years, is a cauldron of potential violence; full of unresolved issues, and of very overarmed and fundamentally volatile states facing each other in shifting enmities and rivalries. Also, the region is vital because it controls the energy source of oil and that increases our stakes in and our interest in the region.

The issues are practical: the defence of Saudi Arabia, the defence of that oil patch, among others, and access to vital energy. But they're also fundamentally principled. Foremost of these is the need to reject, to refute absolutely, the notion of the acquisition of territory by force. This century has been driven almost mad by this notion. The whole United Nations security structure and principles of security maintenance were constructed out of the Second World War in response to this underlying belief.

What are the origins of the crisis? Well they're more or less clear. Iraq, in poor financial shape after its extremely costly war, claimed longstanding territorial disputes; the need for access to the sea in the south and disputed oil fields in that area as well as a justification for invasion. Iraq had been disappointed in its search for debt relief from Kuwait, and especially by alleged overproduction of oil by Kuwait and by the United Arab Emirates, bringing down the price of oil and hence the ability of Iraq to generate revenues to

cover the cost of its war. Much was made of the overproduction from a shared oil field, the Rumaila, a shared natural resource on the border.

Those were the issues. There were attempts to confer and mediate them by concerned people like King Hussein of Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt. Indeed, on July 24, after Iraq had moved two divisions to Kuwait's border, there was a process put into play. Talks collapsed on August 1 and on August 2 there was an invasion and the beginning of the Gulf War.

The response was two-fold. The United States immediately rushed to the defence of Saudi Arabia. It was the only country which could rush that rapidly to Saudi Arabia's defence, which was a fundamentally important thing to do. The United Nations was referred to, under Article 51, and it basically endorsed that move. The second volley was at the United Nations. At times with unprecedented unanimity, and at all times with something unprecedented in the United Nations, Western-USSR solidarity, over the next three months the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions seeking the restoration of the status quo ante bellum.

One of these resolutions, 678, authorized member states to use whatever military means are required in support of sanctions. That was the basis of the creation of the multilateral military co-operation effort. Resolution 678 is without precedent in history when you consider that countries as disparate as Syria, Pakistan, Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Canada and France are joining together in that process.

Much was made of the questionable character of Canadian participation in the U.S. military effort in the Gulf. In fact the CBC constantly talked about the U.S. military effort in the Gulf. It's a fundamental point that this is not a "U.S. military effort in the Gulf"; this is a multilateral effort. If it were a U.S. military effort in the Gulf, it would be a failure. The purpose of this effort is to isolate Iraq. That's why there are 30 countries participating in this effort.

Meanwhile the Arab League broke up over the matter, and disruption occurred on the oil market as Iraqi oil was taken off the market. The Saudis increased production by two billion barrels a day to make up the difference. The windfall profits of that increased production, as well as those of the United Arab Emirates were able to cover much of the cost of the military action and, importantly, the enormous costs to some of the countries involved. The frontline states like Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey have paid a great price as have some of the other countries, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan and several others, which had many people in Kuwait whom they had to

move home and resettle. The fundamental point is the maintenance of the consensus of those countries so that they remain sufficiently solvent to be able to continue, with patience, the long-haul of sanctions.

Meanwhile Iraq had done something else that I think is without precedent, and that is to completely victimize third country nationals, including, as you know, a number of Canadians. It also basically tried to starve – there's no other verb for it – the personnel of the embassies in Kuwait into submission.

The gravity of these actions prompted unprecedented unity of purpose and action among the countries concerned. The critical meeting was the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Helsinki in September, and if ever the true signal of the end of the Cold War occurred, it was that meeting in which the Soviet Union agreed to support the principle of military force at the end of the day if other means didn't work vis-à-vis Iraq.

The readiness to use force if all else fails is something which virtually all the governments of the Security Council endorse. It is a delicate subject, it is a volatile subject, and it is a very little-understood subject, and I would like to go into it.

The important thing to recognize is that nothing short of full compliance with the Security Council sanctions or resolutions is going to be enough. There's no partial solution possible at the outset. And even President Mitterrand (and I say "even" President Mitterrand because he is often cited as somehow being a mediatory figure, and he isn't) states that nothing happens until Iraq is out of Kuwait and until the third-country citizens are all released. Nothing happens. There's no discussion of end-gains, there's no discussion of anything, until that happens.

What's going to happen? One of the things that has happened which I think is wrong has been an overpersonalization of the problem in the personality of Saddam Hussein, a kind of demonization of him. That aside, one does have to look at this man and ask oneself why he's doing what he's doing. Who is he? What does he respect? What does he expect?

First of all, what he respects is very clear. It's force, strength. And it's vital he understand that, to obtain compliance with the Security Council resolutions, force will be used if necessary. The paradox is that the best way not to use force is to make the use of force as plausible as possible.

Does he understand? I think it's very questionable. First of all he doesn't have a lot of people who give him contrary advice – they don't stick around very long. Secondly, it's important to understand that this is a regional player,

he is a regional personality. In his view the United States is the country that allowed the humiliation of its embassy in Iran being occupied for 379 days. He saw the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut and the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut. Without the risk of life the U.S. shelled Beirut from 18 miles off the coast. I think he believes that the United States is not prepared to use force and the countries engaged in the multilateral effort with the United States are not prepared to use force.

The Minister of Information in Iraq said about four weeks ago that as soon as a few dead soldiers came back to the United States Bush will fall. What a tragic misunderstanding of the United States that is. I think that the most fundamental objective of all the countries is to correct that misunderstanding. Iraq will try, of course, to erode the alliance, and the way the hostage issue is being played out is very much part of that. That is what we're seeing every day.

Saddam Hussein is a populist, and he does have popularity, not just in Arab countries, but in several Islamic countries. He is seen as a Moslem, dealing with the Infidel. He is seen as being pro-Palestinian, as a Nasser-like figure. But I don't think you should exaggerate this.

The other powerful regimes in the Middle East – Egypt, Syria, Iran – object to him fundamentally. Even the PLO membership recognizes that they've made a fundamental mistake in supporting the acquisition of territory by force, which to them, of course, is an anathema to everything they stand for. I would also emphasize that our own aid to Palestinians, who have been so displaced either to Jordan or, to a lesser extent, to the West Bank, continues.

There is, of course, in the area, a psychological association on all issues and the killings at the Temple Mount brought all this home – the political complexity of what we're dealing with. It's going to be a very tough time trying to solve this crisis against the backdrop of the Arab-Israeli issue, which we've had on the world's plate for the last 40 years. It's very important that one difficult issue not be allowed to corrupt or complicate the solution of the other issue, so we reject direct linkage. But there is, of course, urgency in trying to find peaceful settlement and communicating that to other issues in the area. The key thing is to use the United Nations.

When the people who created the United Nations out of the wreckage of the Second World War did so, they placed a lot of faith in the five permanent members of the Security Council and in their ability to get together to try to use their aggregated force, weight and influence. Of course the Cold War

dashed these hopes. Now there's a possibility of realizing the United Nations in the form its architects had envisioned. If force has to be used, there is a generalized wish that it should be used with the authority of the United Nations. How do you do that? It's important for us that the United Nations be used. There is an argument which the Americans and the British have endorsed: Article 51 for people who are students of the United Nations Charter. Article 51, applied retroactively, can give the kind of authority from the United Nations which may, at times, be needed. But the thing to understand, as I heard the CBC news this morning saying that war is going to break out any day, which it isn't, is that the important thing to maintain in all of this is the consensus. Unless you have the consensus you don't have the isolation of Iraq, and if you don't have the isolation of Iraq you can't get the understanding across that there is no alternative to getting out.

What is our role? Lots of times I've heard people saying this is outside Canada's traditional role; we should be peacekeepers. Sure we should be peacekeepers, and the best way to keep the peace is to end things that start wars. And one of the things that starts wars is the inadmissible, unilateral acquisition of territory by force; invading other countries.

Our investment over time, our diplomatic creativity over the last 45 years has been put into building up the security structures of the United Nations so that these things work to prevent war. And that is our role, and that is our logical home. It is associating with other countries in defence of what is right, and in objecting to what is wrong. It is in ensuring that there is collective machinery to undo wrong, and above all, to undo the use of force as an expression of wrong. That's why we're in this thing. It is unacceptable to us, because of this special time in history, that the UN should fail. If the UN should fail, the next generation will know chaos. If the Security Council doesn't work this time, there will be chaos. For this reason full compliance on the part of Iraq with the resolutions is fundamental – no partial settlement. This is our quarrel because, as a part of this world, we have a responsibility to contribute to the ensurance of a world order.

When this crisis is over I think people can live with Iraq, they can live with Saddam Hussein. There's talk of some kind of regional security structure, it'll still be a dangerous country. There are a lot of dangerous countries, that's okay. He has weapons of mass destruction, others do too. We need ways to deal with that. I don't think it's helpful to suggest that somehow the leader of that country has to be eliminated. He has to get out of Kuwait, and when

he gets out there are many institutions and mechanisms and processes for referral to arbitrate that country's case. Canada knows a lot about shared natural resources and joint management of natural resources. If they have a case, there are many places they can put it to. They can't use armies to take people hostage to make their case.

And our case as a country – and I'm saying this forcefully because I heard the other day that somebody was "having difficulty" in seeing what Canadian interests are in this thing – our case is to make sure that in the world of the 90s, now that the Cold War's over, that this doesn't happen again.

FORUM

Mr. Said Zafar, CISS Member

Will the borders of Saudi Arabia be kept intact throughout the Persian Gulf crisis? If troops were used in an attempt to take over Saudi Arabia what would be the response?

Mr. Kinsman

The United States rushed 165,000 troops to defend the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. The United States Secretary of State Mr. Baker is in the Middle East now, and Assistant Secretary John Kelly is in Damascus today. You can be certain that it's very clear to everybody that the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia is going to remain intact. Whether vis-à-vis Iraq or vis-à-vis Syria.

I don't think Syria is going to try to take Saudi Arabia. If it does there'll be a response to it, a very decisive response. I don't think there's a lot of planning going on about that, but the people are there do deal with such an event, and certainly they'll deal with it.

Mr. Robert Hendy, CISS Member

Why are you so positive that war will not break out?

Mr. Kinsman

I'm not positive that war will not break out. I'm saying that the CBC said that war is imminent and that diplomatic means are exhausted and war could break out today. I don't think that war is going to break out today. I think it's important that the recourse to force at the end of the day is a plausible one. It has to be plausible both in terms of political will, and in terms of the actual instrument that exists there. When the end of the day is, that I don't know. That's a very complex subject.

These sanctions are among the most efficient sanctions in history. The problem is they haven't been effective in changing Hussein's mind yet. When will they become effective? It's very difficult to say. But the choice, I am suggesting, is not today. I think the choice is possibly two months away, or maybe three months away, or four months away – there are a whole lot of different factors.

Mr. Wayne Flemming, Private Businessman

If we do go to war with Iraq, will we be under United States command?

Mr. Kinsman

The issue of command is a very complex one. There is a feeling that people would somehow be comfortable politically with a UN type command. But there are many people here who have a military background who know that the kind of command that they're comfortable with is anything but that kind of command. Remember that Korea was basically an American command dressed up as a UN command. While the UN has had a lot of operations, they've been peacekeeping operations, not this kind of an operation. So the

command question has been a problem and it's been dissociated in discussions from the "prior authority" issue. In other words you can get prior authority under Article 42 without having to solve that.

What is the solution? Alex Morrison and other people would know more than I would, but the solution isn't a problem with respect to ships, and it's not a problem, probably, with respect to aircraft. It's a problem with respect to ground troops which are currently in Saudi Arabia. While I don't know exactly what went on, Mr. Baker was in Saudi Arabia the day before yesterday, and they worked out the notion there about dual command. They have a sense of structure. They have a sense of structure with the British. They probably are developing some kind of a sense of structure with the Egyptians, and with the Syrians, and with the French.

In today's modern war, which involves a lot more than moving soldiers around, but which involves high technology at night-time and very sophisticated communications which are classified, there are limitations on how much you can share. So that's the answer.

As to Canada, our Forces are and always will be under Canadian command. Bear in mind that the Canadian role is not a particularly large one. Our aircraft are air-to-air interceptors. They're there to offer air cover over the fleet of ships. Our ships, in terms of the use of force, probably are not very pertinent.

Major Arthur Gans, CFB Toronto

Would you care to comment on what you think will be the outcome in terms of the Islamic region, which is what I would prefer to call that area rather than simply the Persian Gulf, when there is a great deal of disagreement among the Shiites and the Sunnis and several other groups? I understand there is a substantial problem among some of the allied groups because of the presence of Western countries on holy soil, and so forth. Would you care to comment on what you see happening there?

Mr. Kinsman

I think any Canadian, Westerner, non-Moslem is able to comment with any authority on these things only if he's a fool. But of course there are tremendous divisions within the area, there always have been and they're complicated by so many things. Saddam Hussein is not himself an adherent to fundamentalist Islam. However, he has a great deal of appeal to many who are. It is they who have created the issue of infidels in holy places, which is being exploited.

I think the one thing that's important to recognize is that a wrong has been committed, and that in the correcting of this wrong it must be done in a way which is as sensitive about the aftermath as possible. Personally I believe that the United States could do this by itself. They won't because they know that the costs of winning, because of the factors that you're talking about, would make it difficult for them.

The changing demography in the Middle East is complicating everything as it is in other places. One thing we have learned is that the dictum of Moslems being reticent about fighting Moslems went down the drain in the Iran-Iraq war. As a matter of fact it's gone down the drain with Islamic Uzbeks kicking out other Moslem minorities in the Soviet Union. The Arab League has broken up.

It's an enormously complicated tableau, but until now the fundamental thing is that something wrong has been done, force has been used and in the interest of balance in the area it's got to be corrected and the situation has to be redeemed. But people are thinking a great deal about the aftermath, and about not doing something which seems arrogant, externally imposed, or excessively intrusive.

Mr. Brodie

Is Canada's role in the Middle East becoming one of proactivism and global concern?

Mr. Kinsman

Canada has always been there. Canada was there in 1956. Lester Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing the solution to the Suez Crisis. And Canadian policy is not a little country's policy. We are a global power, obviously not in the sense that superpowers are, but we're a global power in the sense that we have important relationships and preoccupations everywhere in the world.

We're more preoccupied by South Africa than almost any country from the West that I know. We have tremendous interest in Central America. We're very interested in security in the North Pacific. So, though you've got to pick and choose and measure what you can do effectively, our participation has always been in different parts of the world. We're very involved in the search for peace in Cambodia, for example. In terms of this, I don't think that Canada would be part of any regional, permanent security solution in the Gulf, no. I think we're there now because it was important for a lot of countries to be there. It was important to demonstrate that this is a global effort. That's the only way to communicate the message. That's why we're there.

Unidentified

Are we engaging in a double standard here? We are working with Syria to oppose the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and yet Syria has substantial forces in Lebanon. Does the fact that Syria is in our alliance change the nature of our alliance itself?

Mr. Kinsman

Syria has interests in Lebanon. Syria considers Lebanon as part of greater Syria historically, and has moved into Lebanon several times, and various countries, including the Americans and the French, have also moved into Lebanon. Lebanon is a real tragedy. You could argue that Syria has been trying to assert a certain amount of stabilizing influence there. It's very difficult to say.

I would not say that Syria's response in Lebanon is as big a feature as Syria's historic intransigence about the settlement of Arab-Israeli issues in terms of difficulty. All of that being said, however, the presence of Syria among the countries in this coalition is indeed what gives the coalition an extra bit of plausibility to Saddam Hussein. The inclusion of Syria in this coalition is to some extent a marriage of convenience, but the convenience is that in that area where everybody is heavily armed there are certain countries which can't attack other countries – those big countries, because the stakes are simply too high. The one upside of things is that there is no longer any Cold War volatility attached to the region. I think the fact that Syria is part of this is a very good thing. I don't know if at the end of the day that's going to change the basic character of Syrian perceptions on the region, but I think that if this works – and it should work – that it may be something of a constraint.

Susan McNish

Mr. Kinsman, I am a student at Glendon College, and a research associate at the CISS. On behalf of everyone here I'd like to thank you, Mr. Kinsman, for being with us today and for sharing your thoughts on what's happening in the Persian Gulf. Thank you very much.

DAVID LIGHTBURN

NATO: WHERE TO FROM HERE?

Colonel David Harries, National Defence College

Our first speaker this afternoon is David Lightburn, whom I have known for many years. He is currently a member of NATO's International Staff, in the Defence Planning and Policy Division. Mr. Lightburn had a distinguished 30 year career in the Canadian Forces from which he retired in the rank of Colonel. In his last posting, between 1982 and 1985, he served as Military Advisor to the Canadian Ambassador to NATO.

In 1987 he joined NATO, where his primary responsibility is the co-ordination of Alliance defence planning. In 1988 he developed NATO's approach to the sensitive issue of burden sharing, and prepared the report on the subject, which was subsequently made public.

Mr. Lightburn is currently engaged in studying the implications of the CFE and international events on Alliance Defence Planning.

David Lightburn

This afternoon I would like to give you some indication of how the NATO Alliance is adjusting to the changing international environment and to discuss with you the immediate future. In doing so I will first say a few words about change itself, and then outline the future of the Alliance, consider some fre-

quently espoused alternatives to NATO, look at the principal challenges ahead, and conclude by referring briefly to NATO's near-term agenda.

The changes that have taken place, and that continue to unfold, are dramatic, dynamic and to some degree unpredictable. I need not remind you of the events of the past year, events that have transformed the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, that have dramatically altered our approach to security from one of confrontation to co-operation, and that have made it possible for security and stability in Europe at lower levels of military forces and tension. This has led to public expectations of even greater reductions in military forces and states of readiness, of a significant peace dividend (in financial terms), and of a continuation of the process of democratization in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself.

The pace of change, coupled with some uncertainties before us, does however imply an element of instability. During the current "transitional" period we need to remember the lesson of the past two years, namely "that change itself can be sudden and unpredictable", and there can be change for the worse as well as change for the better.

But that is a pessimistic note and not in keeping with the current mood and expectation. Change for the better is real. I have personally been witness to the parade of Eastern European Heads of State, Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Moreover, we now have the bilateral embassies of those countries in Belgium fully accredited to NATO, with frequent visits by the bilateral ambassadors. The Soviets have recently requested that their embassy in Brussels be expanded to handle the newly evolving relationship with both NATO and the European Community. Two weeks ago, on three successive days, we had the Romanian Prime Minister, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff and the Hungarian Defence Minister discussing security and other issues with a range of Alliance civil and military officials. The Secretary-General, Dr. Woerner, is out of town this week so all is relatively quiet, but on his return he immediately receives the Bulgarian Foreign Minister. One had to have witnessed Soviet General Moiseyev "bear hugging" his U.S. counterpart, General Powell, in front of all of the Alliance Chiefs of Defence; and the subsequent spectre of a Soviet General organizing an "arm-in-arm" photograph of the top Soviet and Alliance military men, and exclaiming "it has taken over 45 years to get this photograph!" Real and positive change is indeed occurring.

So what then does this positive change mean for the Alliance? The debate on NATO's future has only begun. The fashionable views are that the "threat" has vanished and the security problem has been solved, that NATO is a victim of its own success and is superfluous, and that security is less important now and can be obtained more easily and less expensively.

Two options for a revised NATO have been suggested in the public debate. The first is a more technical organization that would manage the integrated defence and oversee the implementation of arms control agreements. This is a low profile approach, and it assumes that the European Community (EC), the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU) automatically accept such an arrangement. The second possibility, and the one that is clearly being pursued in Brussels, is an Alliance with a more important political role in the shaping of a new, a free and a more secure Europe. This is a more dynamic approach and is not automatically or necessarily in conflict with the objectives of other (European) institutions.

The Secretary-General argues that the Alliance is needed for three reasons: first for political reasons, to assist in transforming Europe; second for security reasons, a defensive Alliance to assist in preserving security and stability; and third as a framework for transatlantic relations.

What is it, then, that makes NATO different from other institutions like the EC, the evolving CSCE and the WEU?

- it remains the only way of firmly anchoring the United States and Canada in Europe;
- it is the best way of integrating the strategically important countries of Norway, Turkey and Iceland;
- it is the only way of ensuring stability in the long transitional phase to democracy, co-operation and eventual European political integration;
- it is the only way of mobilizing, in a structured way, the collective energies of the industrialized West in response to global challenges; and
- it has the machinery to guarantee security through its integrated military structure.

On this last point, the maintenance of the integrated military structure is one of the keys to NATO's future. It has always had a deterrent value far in excess of forces actually allocated in peacetime. Furthermore, it is in no-one's interest to "renationalize" security. European nations would gradually

define their interests against each other rather than with each other; the only time a nation really feels secure is when its neighbours feel insecure. Security also requires that it be the largest players, not the smallest, that are the most integrated and thus prevented from acting as strategic pivots. Moreover, at a time of uncertain risks, when one cannot easily define the minimum parameters for national defence planning, then a collective approach is most sensible and provides for a degree of flexibility. Integrated defence is also cost-effective. Finally, an integrated approach to defence has a salutary value for Central and Eastern Europe. The emerging democracies have not yet exchanged a bad system of security for a more benevolent one. The Warsaw Treaty Organization wanted internal conformity more than it focused on external defence. Bilateral co-operation with NATO is one alternative, but not to the extent of those nations joining NATO. That would be threatening to the Soviet Union and ultimately destabilizing. The Alliance therefore offers a model of co-operation, stability and regional security.

So what then are the possible alternatives to NATO? Two have been expressly touted: the EC, possibly with the WEU as its military basis, and the CSCE. The continuing development of these institutions is in the best interests of NATO as contributions to the new Europe and to a stable situation, but they are not viewed to be reasonable alternatives.

For the EC, a European defence identity is a long-standing goal of the United States and the Alliance. There is a need for a distinctive Europe as a full partner, but Europe reflects shared interests, values and commonality with North America. Outside NATO a purely European approach could indeed harmonize security policies, but it could not guarantee security. A system based on two disconnected Western pillars would not work either. Nor would a system in which Europe manages the high policies of security, leaving the U.S. the more mundane role of providing the forces for Europe's defence.

In addition, Europeanization must not make the Alliance more Eurocentric, at a time when its chief attraction to the U.S. and Canada will come increasingly from its willingness to look at security in a broader sense and to look outwards. One other difficulty with the EC alternative is that, at present, Norway, Turkey and Iceland are not members; and what happens when Sweden and Austria press their cases for EC membership?

NATO needs to throw the right switches in order to ensure that the strengths of both the EC and NATO are harmonized. A European pillar needs

to be encouraged, as part of the "new Atlanticism", as Secretary Baker refers to the broader arrangement. There is an immediate need for closer working ties between NATO and the EC to avoid wasteful duplication and competitive stances, and these are being developed.

The other alternative is the CSCE. The CSCE is a forum for co-operation involving the West, the Soviets, the Eastern European democracies and neutral European nations. In this sense it is crucial. It will also allow the new democracies a chance to prove their credentials for eventual inclusion into Western Europe's political and economic integration. The CSCE will be institutionalized and will have a Parliamentary Assembly for Europe, a conflict prevention center, a mechanism for monitoring elections and more frequent high-level political meetings. It will play a greater role in promoting security through verification of arms control agreements, through additional confidence and security building measures, through transparency, through information exchange, and, perhaps, through a measure of crisis management.

But the CSCE cannot guarantee security. It is likely to be unwieldy. Each member has a veto, and yet many different value systems come to the table. Moreover, the U.S. would be marginalized under some form of CSCE command structure. The CSCE is also new; it needs a chance to prove itself and to develop. It will work all the better with limited objectives and reasonable expectations initially and should not be overloaded at the outset.

One other concluding but important point that is germane to this issue of alternatives is the view of the East. During the Secretary-General's visits to Eastern Europe many Eastern leaders have made it abundantly clear that NATO, and not the EC or CSCE, offers the best hope for stability and security in the region at a time of rapid and unpredictable change.

As we move forward a number of challenges become evident. Earlier I reported the Secretary-General's three reasons for a new NATO; political, defence and transatlanticism. Each of these *raisons d'être* poses challenges.

On the political side there are a half dozen principal challenges:

> shaping the new European architecture; not allowing the old East-West ideological split to be replaced by a division based on wealth and living standards;

- intensifying contracts with the East; essentially following up the powerful message of co-operation emanating from the London Summit in July 1990;
- extending the arms control process; ultimately to ensure that defence structures and transparency make war militarily impossible and politically unthinkable;
- pursuing a revised overall strategy for security;
- promoting a new Atlanticism; and
- checking the new challenges to security; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example has gone.

On the defence side there are three major challenges; the development of an appropriate military strategy, the actual planning for defence at a time of rapid and significant change, and the resources needed for this effort.

On the first of these, the military strategy, the London Declaration appears to have presented defence planners with a bit of a dichotomy. On the one hand the message of co-operation and the burying of adversarial relationships, yet on the other a clearly stated need for defence. Seen in context all this makes sense; but in developing the detail of a military strategy two fundamentally different approaches are emerging; one that emphasizes political co-operation and seeks radical change and the other that incrementally adjusts current thinking. On the substance of the evolving strategy, flexible response, with its implied escalatory steps, is now being considered in terms of "crisis management and war prevention". Forward defence is now to be defence "of borders" not "on borders". And there remains the question of the ever-sensitive nuclear aspects.

For defence planners new concepts are emerging; and emphasis is on flexibility in both structures and use of forces, the ability to reconstitute forces, and inter-region reinforcement in Europe, to name but a few. Readiness of forces is already considerably reduced and may be redefined in terms of immediate reaction forces, early defence forces and reinforcing forces. The key is to retain sufficient in-place forces so that a crisis in the future can be met in stages and does not automatically trigger a call for mobilization. Military structures are changing: five new multinational corps will exist in Central Europe; as a contingency additional multinational reinforcement of the Northern and Southern flanks is foreseen; and navies may be used in new on-call, graduated and tailored multinational forces.

On the matter of resources, a peace dividend is clearly expected, indeed is already being cashed in through reductions in many nations' defence budgets. Viewing the problem using one set of logic, however, there is a case that navies are unaffected by the CFE Treaty, air forces are more important owing to their flexibility and range, armies are changing in nature, transferring and destroying equipment has a cost, verifying the treaty has a cost, and even closing bases and demobilizing forces has a significant near term cost. The reality, though, is less resources, and defence planning will have to adjust to that reality.

The third broad challenge is the transatlantic one. The relationship between the U.S. and Europe needs to be clearly conceptualized. The lack of clear vision at this time is affecting all aspects of the emerging situation. The U.S. is pressing hard for recognition of the broader risks to security and is emphasizing the "out-of area" factor. Europe, on the other hand, is tending to become very Eurocentric through other institutionalization issues. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's "new Atlanticism" needs to be given life.

Let me conclude by focusing on NATO's immediate agenda, things to watch over the next few months.

- the CSCE Summit; the signing of the Treaty and prospects for further progress in arms control;
- Elections in Germany; Germany remains the key to a healthy and stable Alliance;
- the Gulf and its impact on NATO and on the Alliance's strategy debate;
- the new U.S. Congress; will there be a new burden sharing debate spurred on by developments in the Gulf?; and
- a possible NATO Summit in 1991, with Mr. Gorbachev in attendance.

TIMOUR DMITRICHEV

THE UNITED NATIONS, A NEW ERA: SUCCESS AT LAST

Colonel David Harries

Our second speaker this afternoon is Mr. Timour Dmitrichev, who is currently Director of the Planning and Research Co-ordination and Development unit in the office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) of the Offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Dmitrichev holds a PhD in International Relations and United Nations Affairs from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and a Doctorate of Science in Multilateral Diplomacy from the Institute of International Relations, both in Moscow.

Throughout his career he has participated in many international diplomatic and scientific conferences, dealing with disarmament, international security and preventive diplomacy, among other subjects. In the United Nations Mr. Dmitrichev has served in the Department of Conference Services and the UN Legal Office. From 1984 to 1987 he was Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Mr. Dmitrichev is the first Soviet citizen to have a full-time permanent position in the United Nations.

Mr. Timour Dmitrichev

Coming from the United Nations I consider it an honour and a privilege to be invited to speak at this seminar of your renowned institute on the topic, "The United Nations, A New Era: Success at Last". The fact that your institute has placed a United Nations theme on the agenda of a seminar dedicated to the Canadian Strategic Forecast 1991, is a telling illustration not only of a continued interest and support for the United Nations in this country, but also of the importance that Canadian governmental and non-governmental institutions like yours attach to the role and activities of the UN in this new, post-Cold War world.

Until recently the words "success" and "the United Nations", which figure in the title of this topic, seemed incompatible, reflecting the wide gap between the high hopes and expectations associated with the establishment of the UN and what the UN delivered over the four decades of its existence.

Created in the closing stages of the most devastating of armed conflicts mankind has ever known, the United Nations, as stated in its Charter, set out the most noble ideals, purposes, principles and universal human values. Among other things, it expressed the determination of the peoples throughout the world to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the rule of law, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. It was called upon to maintain international peace and security as its primary task; to develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples; to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. The Charter also laid out the provisions for a machinery and procedures to be used in carrying out those important tasks. At that time, it seemed that the United Nations had everything it needed to become a success.

Unfortunately, founded on the assumption of unity and co-operation of its membership, particularly among the five great powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, the United Nations could not function effectively under conditions of growing differences which degenerated into an ideological, political and military confrontation brought about by the advent

of the Cold War. Instead of a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations, the United Nations became a stage and an instrument of ideological and politico-diplomatic battles between the opposing blocs. Despite those deep divisions and mistrust, the United Nations did make progress in some areas like decolonization, peacekeeping, progressive codification of international law, as well as technical and economic assistance to developing countries. On the whole, however, its activities were basically sterile and helpless, bordering dangerously on irrelevance. All this, coupled with deserved and undeserved criticism of its performance by states, the media and the general public, gradually led to the decline in the prestige and authority of the United Nations. The failure of the United Nations to function effectively, however, was hardly its own fault; the organization only truthfully reflected the realities of a world to which relegated it to the status of a misfit or a nuisance. In this setting, it was abused, under-used and even ignored.

The present widely-acknowledged and publicized rebirth of the United Nations and its long-delayed return to the centre stage of international affairs is a result of the momentous changes that have taken place in the world in recent years. For its part the United Nations had synergistically responded to those revolutionary transformations by making its own important contribution to the cause of international peace and security.

These momentous transformations, both in the United Nations and globally, have become possible thanks to the gradually improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, among the permanent members of the Security Council, and between East and West generally. But probably the single most important factor in generating and sustaining these changes was the new thinking in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, including its United Nations dimension, coupled with subsequent incredible, internal developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

It took the West some time to realize that Gorbachev and his policies were real; and after decades of hostility, confrontation and mistrust this was a rather natural reaction.

Reflecting on the essence of the situation as it existed in the past and on the changes that followed, Mr. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, described it very vividly in his statement to the current session of the General Assembly:

We in the West, (and, one may parenthetically say, in the East), perhaps to an extreme, used to view the world through the prism of the Cold War.

That prism determined many of our priorities and guided our actions. That prism was a prison, and it has now been shattered. The consequence has been liberation. Liberation for millions in Central and Eastern Europe who now experience democracy where they only recently dreamt of it. Liberation for the minds of men and women who can now turn to old problems long neglected and the new problems now before us. Liberation for the world, which is now being freed from the tensions of a European balance of terror that penetrated to the farthest corner of the globe. And liberation for this organization where the words of the United Nations Charter can cease to be distant goals and may now become descriptions of our common action.

Today there has already been plenty of action at the United Nations and its accomplishments over the past several years, modest as they may be in view of the daunting challenges, can undoubtedly be qualified a success and the beginning of a new era in the history of the world for the United Nations.

The first breakthrough came in 1988 when, after a long and patient search for a settlement in Afghanistan, the United Nations arranged for and supervised the withdrawal of Soviet troops in that war-torn country. This success was followed by another: the cessation of the long, brutal war between Iran and Iraq and the beginning of peace negotiations between them with the United Nations acting as an intermediary. Then came a UN-sponsored and mediated agreement on a settlement of the armed conflict in Western Sahara, which for years had pitted Morocco against the Sahrawi people of that former Spanish territory in their fight for independence. During that same year the United Nations Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, succeeded in bringing the feuding Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus back to the negotiating table and in keeping the dialogue going. The United Nations always remained in the wings of the painful on-again-off-again talks involving Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States in order to achieve independence for Namibia, together with the withdrawal from Angola of Cuban and South African troops.

On 16 February, 1989, the United Nations Security Council and all those present in its majestic chamber burst into a lasting applause – something no one in attendance could ever recall happening within the walls of this solemn body. The reason for this unusual outburst was the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 632 approving the dispatch of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to Namibia to prepare and oversee the transition of that territory to independence through free elec-

tions. That enabling resolution capped many years of arduous attempts by the international community to wrestle that country from the illegal grip of South Africa and lead it to statehood.

Only weeks after that decision, the United Nations was already mounting one of its largest peacemaking and peacekeeping operations with many novel features related to the creation of conditions for holding free and fair elections, playing its part in monitoring and implementing a cease-fire, withdrawing and demobilizing troops, monitoring a local police force, managing a political "normalization" process, supervising and controlling the resultant elections and assisting the transition to independence, not to mention the return and resettlement of thousands and thousands of refugees. That same year Namibia joined the United Nations as an independent and sovereign state.

Another and successful first accomplishment happened this past summer in Nicaragua where the UN, together with the Organization of American States helped to implement a Central American solution to the civil war in that country by participating in disarming the resistance army of over 20,000 men and monitoring the elections. Never before had a sovereign country requested this kind of assistance from an international organization. This new role for the United Nations in helping the process of internal democratization inspired at least half a dozen countries to seek its assistance in this area. The organization is now actively involved in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of internal conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, while continuing preparations for supervising forthcoming elections in Haiti and a referendum in Western Sahara.

The United Nations also did a lot of spade groundwork to enable the parties to the protracted conflict in Cambodia to begin a long-awaited settlement which, as expected, may involve yet another unprecedented role of practically running that country in the transition period prior to the elections in the near future.

Deservedly, the unparalleled successes of the United Nations in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities over a short period of one year were crowned by a Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.

All of these developments have contributed greatly to restoring the prestige and authority of the United Nations, as well as to a perceptible change of its image from a talking, and propaganda forum to an active world organization that is capable of important achievements on a global scale.

With so many conflicts going on (1988 saw about 20 armed conflicts alone), with scores of unsettled disputes, active or latent, with so many regional and global problems facing the world, the United Nations is expected to do far more in the future, if it is only given the opportunity to perform its functions as envisaged by the Charter.

The action taken by the UN on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with regard to practical implementation of the relevant Charter provisions, including collective enforcement measures, is a powerful demonstration of the potential of the organization for handling most serious threats to international peace and security when there is a commonality of purpose and political will among its members, particularly the great powers.

The general atmosphere within the United Nations has also improved dramatically: it has become business-like, constructive and result-oriented. The only hot polemics which flared up during the last session of the General Assembly were between Arab States and Israel over the Palestinian issue. On all other issues there are certainly disagreements and they are bound to continue, but now they tend to be more honest and therefore negotiable.

Regrettably, having scored impressive achievements in the area of peacekeeping and peacemaking, the United Nations is not in a position to boast of notable successes in many of its other activities such as disarmament and social and economic affairs. It is particularly ironic that at the time of these major breakthroughs, it finds itself in a dire financial situation that prevents it from exploiting its success and the opportunities that have presented themselves of late.

Yes we have every right to say that the world and the United Nations are entering a new era and that this organization is a success at last, even if this success is limited essentially to the area of peace and security. Some progress is registered in other fields, with many great and important issues on the agenda of the international community and the UN, such as underdevelopment, debt, drugs, AIDS, the environment, human rights, proliferation of weapons, still waiting for more resolute action.

And there are many other problems for the United Nations of a more general and specific nature which are generated by new realities.

Today the United Nations faces the world which, in many important respects, is different from the one into which it was born and grew up. Created in 1945 primarily to maintain international peace and security as an organization of sovereign territorial states it now has to deal with a modified

concept of security itself, a new set of security issues, and an erosion of the traditional notion of sovereignty.

Challenges to the old concepts and practices are coming from various directions. The rise of complex interdependence is working against the autonomy of sovereign territorial states in many fields including national security, economics, finance, human rights, environment, ideology, and so forth. Without much ado, most states accept conditions set by international institutions for assistance in the improvement of their economic affairs. They submit to investigations by other UN bodies of their human rights record and are forced to comply with established international norms. Indeed, every new international treaty or legal norm chops away at the concept of national sovereignty. Sovereignty is also undermined by the appearance and growing importance of new non-state actors on the world scene: transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations; public movements like the Greens; religious fundamentalism etc; and even prominent individuals.

The rapid growth of world trade as well as the unprecedented problems of financial transfers ($10-15 billion a day in 1975 to $200 billion a day in 1988) has diminished the ability of individual governments to control their internal interest rates, banking systems and trade policies. (It is ironic, for example, that the U.S. government has been pressing the EEC to open its markets to Japanese cars produced in the United States, i.e., on behalf of a foreign-based transnational actor.) Globalization of markets and production is bringing states closer, while making their territorial boundaries less and less relevant. The escalating scientific and technological progress with the accompanying revolution of communications further imposes interdependence on national states.

The traditional territorial state is yielding ground to the trading state. The ascendancy of economic security works against traditional security issues dominated by military power (the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union). Military power is losing its usefulness and application for the advancement of national interests and regulating international order (such as Vietnam and Afghanistan). In the light of revolutionary transformations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the military alliances are becoming more and more irrelevant. The ideological divide which used to be the backbone of political, security, military and economic policies is disappearing. The arms race has lost its *raison d'être*. Non-military aspects of security are coming to the fore. Quite a number of them have become global issues which

no state is capable of solving by itself – international debt, AIDS, drugs, terrorism, the environment. Armed conflicts again and again prove their futility in resolving problems which cry out for peaceful solutions.

All of these and many other factors are pushing territorial nation-states into a globally integrated economic and political system with its own set of issues requiring and making readjustments and innovations more possible than ever before, joint efforts and co-operation on the part of all existing and emerging actors. Such coordinated actions are indispensable if we are to meet the new challenges adequately and be better prepared, avoiding damaging disruptions, breakdowns or the dangers of far-reaching consequences.

By its very nature the United Nations and its system of agencies are called upon to be a collective instrument of the international community for jointly meeting the existing and new challenges. Like other actors, the United Nations must also adapt to the emerging new environment. To be able to change and to lead it needs the will of its members to equip it accordingly, conceptually, structurally and financially. With so many challenges ahead and with so little money to go around, the only major source of funding now seems to be the peace dividend. The more than $1 trillion a year spent by the world on armaments is an astronomical waste, at least part of which could be put to better use for the benefit of all in this world of rapid and fundamental changes, a world of new challenges and new hopes.

All of this requires a fresh global plan of action to be elaborated and agreed on by the international community. The United Nations is the logical place to begin to carry out this vital and difficult, yet indispensable and honourable task.

> *Now that the civilized world is becoming a single body – a living network which cannot be destroyed without ... damage for everyone ... we want ... law and not force used to decide... not only the condition of individuals and cities but the condition of nations.*

These words were written, surprisingly, by the Frenchman, Frederick Passy in 1870. Passy, it seems, was well ahead of his time. That time has come. A new era in international relations has begun and the recent success of the United Nations augurs well for a better future for all nations and in-

dividuals in a world which your remarkable compatriot Marshall McLuhan described almost 30 years ago as becoming "a global village".

HANS-BERNHARD PFANNENBERG

CHANGE AND CHALLENGE: UNITED GERMANY

Colonel David Harries

Our final speaker on the panel is Dr. Hans-Bernhard Pfannenberg, an international Research Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and an expert in the field of disarmament and development.

Dr. Pfannenberg studies at the African Institute of the Karl Marx University in Leipzig. He holds a Ph.D from the Academy of Social Sciences in Berlin, where he has researched and lectured on problems of social stratification and the role of the army in Ethiopia.

Between 1983 and 1989 Dr. Pfannenberg served at the Planning Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in East Germany, focusing particularly on foreign policies with respect to the Third World. He has held the position of Attache for bilateral relations with African States, in the Ministry's Africa Department and Cultural Division.

Dr. Pfannenberg has worked abroad as Cultural Attache and Deputy Chief of the East German Consulate General in Tanzania and Zanzibar, and at the embassy in Ethiopia as a member of the political division.

In reading through Dr. Pfannenberg's Curriculum Vitae, the thing that struck me most was the languages that he writes and speaks: German, English, Swahili, Russian, French, and Nigerian Hausa. When we talk about the large global village, and all the complex problems and challenges there

are in it, the fact that he can write and speak all these languages makes him particularly suited to talk about world changes.

Dr. Hans-Bernhard Pfannenberg

Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great privilege and a great pleasure for me to be here in front of you, participating in the annual seminar of the CISS. My special thanks are due to the new elected president of the CISS, Don MacNamara, and to the Executive Director of the CISS, Alex Morrison, who invited me to participate in this meeting.

I am especially glad that we get together in Toronto, in a town with a very deep concern for me and my family. Why?

On 16 November 1989 in Ontario, in the first snow flurries of the Canadian winter, a genuinely old Oldsmobile left the small town of St. Catharines. The occupants of the car, the Mennonite minister of St. Catharines and his wife, together with a German family, drove silently, thoughtfully and yet hopefully to the Toronto Airport.

For those Germans in Canada the point was to say farewell and fly back once more to their old homeland which, in July of that same year, they had to leave as refugees, crossing four national borders. Parting and departure in July, parting and departure in November of the same year – one German destiny amongst hundreds of thousands in that year, amongst millions in the previous four decades of German history.

I, father of that German family which crossed the Atlantic for the second time in a year in that historic November of 1989, am here before you today, to try and seek answers to some of the questions raised by "Change and Challenge - United Germany".

As a German contemporary historian, as a one-time diplomat and East German citizen, as a German belonging to a generation moulded by the post-war development of a Europe which was characterized by the East-West conflict, I do not raise the question of the historic change and the historical challenge in a merely rhetorical sense. I raise this question within the framework of a personal reappraisal of German and European history in terms of the closest interlocking of national and international aspects with which we are all involved as representatives of our various states.

What does this historic change mean in the history of the German people and their allies? What does this historic change mean for Europe? And wherein lies the challenge of German unity for our people and for the newly-united state as a partner in the Alliance?

Let me briefly rehearse those precipitous events. I do not mean to do this merely for the sake of yet another exercise in German introspection. The point is rather that we may direct our gaze towards the future. It is only possible to deal with the future if we come to terms with the past and assimilate it properly into the present.

On 23 August of this year, the Volkskammer, the Parliament of the then German Democratic Republic (GDR), resolved that the GDR would accede to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on 3 October.

On 12 September the signing in Moscow of the Two-Plus-Four "Treaty on the Concluding Settlement with Reference to Germany" brought to a close the 45-year post-war era. With this, the East-West conflict and the division of Europe were also formally brought to an end, without, however, anyone knowing what the future structure and final direction of the process thus set in motion would take. Only one year earlier, immediately before the 40th anniversary of the GDR, anyone who had imagined this change would have been dismissed as a political dreamer or fantasist.

For a long time to come, the political and academic analysis will concern itself with how, within a period so short in terms of history, it was possible for a peaceful revolution on the streets to lead to the self-dissolution of the second part of the German state and to the abandoning of almost all of the iron dogmas of Soviet policy on Germany. The answer is only to be found in the dialectic between these internal and external aspects.

The peaceful revolution of November 1989, with its dramatic events and changes, found both the general public and the politicians in East and West equally unprepared. Most surprised of all were those who, up until this point, had thought that the larger part of the population of the GDR had come to terms with the state, or had at least retired in frustration into a form of internal emigration.

The illusion prevailed that the expansion of inner German communication over the previous few years had created an outlet which had reduced or dispelled the discontent with conditions in the country. And with regard to the external aspects of a Germany divided until 1989, many people believed that

the Western Alliance had come to terms with the territorial and political status quo in Germany and consequently in Europe.

The collapse of the regime, the result of a process which began with the opening of the Wall on 9 November, revealed that the whole of the West German public, indeed the whole of the public in the West, had wrongly estimated the political and economic state of the GDR. Wrong, too, was the estimation of the actual stability of the regime and the real desire for freedom amongst the majority of the population, silent for 40 years.

The question which is really central for the present-day analysis, therefore, is why the leadership clique around Honecker neither succeeded in introducing, nor even attempted to introduce, an evolutionary development a la "perestroika" before the disaster, in good enough time to ensure their own survival. This question takes us back to the year 1984. From this time on the leaders of the GDR were no longer prepared to follow entirely the changing ideas of the rapidly changing Kremlin leaders in terms of foreign policy; above all in terms of the policy towards Germany.

This process of differentiation within what had previously been complete unanimity was increasingly reinforced after the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985. The most important differences between the leadership of the GDR and that of the Soviet Union up until this point concerned the bilateral relationship, Soviet policy on Germany and Soviet concepts of integration in COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev's new evaluation of the situation within the Eastern bloc; his rejection of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which began to emerge in 1987; the "Principle of Free Choice" in terms of development – all these were important preconditions for the success of the later revolutionary development in the GDR.

It is true that Honecker still knew how to make use of the expanded scope in foreign affairs. He did not, however, understand that in his "new thinking" on "perestroika" and "glasnost", the Soviet General Secretary and current President also envisaged future internal political changes in the partner states of the Warsaw Pact; changes which he explicitly encouraged.

The Stalinist GDR leadership was far too elderly to be either willing or able in this respect. They could not react adequately to Gorbachev's radical revision of external and internal political dogmas, which became apparent after 1987. The USSR's unconditional renunciation of its leadership role as protector and policeman, which first made the changes in Hungary and

Poland possible, did not induce Honecker and his comrades to introduce a German variant of the "new thinking". And so a mass exodus began, as the possibility emerged of leaving the country via Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, or by way of the Federal Republic's Permanent Representation in East Berlin.

When, on 10 September 1989, the Hungarian government, without the agreement of the government of the GDR, allowed all those wishing to leave the GDR to cross into the Federal Republic and, one day later, opened the border into Austria, the process began which Mikhail Gorbachev had spoken of in his remarkable speech in Berlin on 6 October, 1989: "Life penalizes those who come too late."

In this sense the collapse of the German partial state could no longer be halted. The people ran from an exhausted leadership. The wheel of history could not be stopped. The historically unique path to the unity of the German state opened up and the Russians, too, could do nothing but accept it.

Wherein does the challenge occasioned by this change now lie? Now that the aim, long hoped for over several generations, has been achieved, have we Germans learned our historical lesson from the complexities of our more recent history? I hope so!

First and foremost, our most recent history is a complex lesson teaching us how to be capable of recognizing and using historic opportunities, how to become a constructive and dynamic element in European development. By constructive and dynamic, I mean that the process of European unification should be stimulated and not burdened by our national unification, which latter process was not brought to a conclusion on 3 October. But this is only possible for a united Germany if we Germans recognize that contributing to the strengthening of the Western Atlantic Alliance is the guarantee of our national role in a changing world.

The question as to how far the Germans are capable of being allies has always been a real problem of our people. The wrong answer to this question has always led to national decline, involving many victims.The fact that the larger part of the one-time German Reich provided the right answer to this question after the Second World War led it into the community of Western democracies, into the political and security alliance of NATO. And arising out of this community came the strength and perseverance for us Germans – and that included those of us in the then-Eastern sector – to struggle for our lost national unity.

Against the background of the most recent developments amongst our people and in East-West relations, this coming together also smoothed our way towards finding a balance, a reduction of tension, and co-operation with our neighbours to the east. Since the general collapse of Stalinist state structures, they now require extensive and collective help from the West for their development.

The result of this unambiguous response to the question of our position in and contribution to the Western Alliance was not only the confirmation and the satisfaction of achieving our national aims. It also gave rise to objective requirements for practical action within the larger international dimension. German foreign policy and security policy will in future be dedicated even more to this requirement, as the German Foreign Minister emphasized in his speech to the United Nations. It is precisely in this way that united Germany, as a European national state, will have to prove its political credibility to the world.

And tomorrow's world, despite all these changes which are so positive from a German and European viewpoint, will not be any the more stable. It is not yet free of the great global imbalances, of insecurity, instability and conflict. It will continue to be shaken by civil wars, regional conflicts and the processes of decline. The so-called global problems will present an ever greater challenge, a challenge which no one will be able to resist alone.

All the more, then, this future world will mean that we Germans require not only the stabilization of the national framework but also the traditional alliance of NATO together with the new, reliable security structures of a united Europe. The redefined NATO, with its nuclear potential in Europe, will continue in the future to constitute the counter-balance to the superpower to the East. In this way, it will also be the guarantee for our unity.

Over and above that, however, it will be more than ever concerned with guaranteeing and organizing defence against new, as yet inestimable, supra-regional challenges, challenges towards which we, too, as a united nation, must take a stand in conjunction with our Alliance partners. In the interests of what has already been achieved in Europe and in the interests of safeguarding the newly-attained German unity, there is no alternative to the Atlantic Alliance; no alternative, that is, for the maintenance of the geo-strategic balance, for the securing of peace, for the continuation of disarmament and for arms limitation. Hence, our national contribution must be made to the process of the political development of the Alliance, a development

taking us over the threshold of a capacity for crisis management and problem management to a capacity for finding solutions to the causes of conflicts and problems. This task reaches beyond the traditional geo-strategic limits of a military Atlantic responsibility. But this is a necessity in a more vulnerable and interdependent world.

German unity, extracted from the internal German tensions, but also from the disintegrating East-West conflict, seems to place us Germans once more in a historically familiar, ambivalent geo-strategic middle position in a continually divided continent. Only if we intellectually resolve this supposed position into a growing European, Atlantic and global responsibility, will we escape from scepticism about German seesaw politics, claims to supremacy and national self-isolation with all the attendant dangerous consequences.Only in this way will we, in a united Germany, act appropriately for the new conditions of the 1990s, conditions which enable us to operate as a bridge between East and West, and between North and South.

Doing so will also guarantee that there will be no return in German history to a politically free-floating German nation state. The larger Germany will, therefore, not be a "Greater Germany"; a "Greater Germany" wishing to pursue world politics on its own account and at its own risk. Instead, the larger Germany will share global responsibility within European and Atlantic needs and requirements.

These are the continuation and support of the balance between East and West, whilst at the same time helping and leading the East towards a united Europe. Part of the process of political unification in our continent requires new security structures which will make further disarmament possible and thus make solutions to global problems more easily realizable, both politically and materially.

With maxims of this kind, a united Germany can find a place in the changing world order which corresponds to its increased wealth as well as to its interests. And it can do so without disturbing regional or global equilibria. Responsible, predictable and an integral part of the Western Alliance, as well as a stimulus for co-operation with the East, understood in these terms, a united Germany will be able to provide a genuine contribution to "burden sharing", the sharing of responsibility which has increased for us all.

FORUM

Barbara Bedont, York University

Mr. Lightburn, one of the things that I was struck by in your discussion was that, in 45 minutes of talking about NATO's future roles, nuclear strategy was only mentioned briefly. You stated that NATO is now considering less reliance on nuclear weapons, and to me this is very interesting. One of the principles that I've been studying is the principle of ambiguity, and the disadvantages with that principle. For example, it creates suspicion and the perception of threat amongst your opponents, and as we know, if your opponent feels threatened, than we are also threatened. It is a NATO policy to remain ambiguous on whether or not it will resort to nuclear weapons first, before the Soviet Union. Talking to East Europeans and reading East European viewpoints, this principle is confirmed, that there are many disadvantages to ambiguity. I don't know what East Europeans say to NATO officials face to face, but from what I've read, they say that they want a Europe without NATO and they consider NATO a military alliance and not a political alliance. I would suggest that NATO's policy, or lack of policy in renouncing first use, is one of the roots of this perception and I would like to ask you: how can we begin talking about future roles for NATO without first addressing this very important issue; why does NATO not renounce the first use of nuclear weapons?

Mr.Lightburn

Thank you for the million dollar question! Several things – first of all you talk about East European officials. I accept that you have talked to people who have expressed the view that you indicated, but I also go back to my point that official East Europe, and it is a continuing message, does accept that NATO is a pillar of stability in the region. Those countries have been given assurances by the NATO Secretary-General that nuclear weapons are on the agenda, that the continuing CFE talks, wherever and however they take place, will address first of all this issue of the short range weapons; they are critical for all the reasons that you have indicated, and are rapidly losing their value.

You are correct that the London Declaration did talk about these weapons and as a weapon of last resort, that was diplomatic language, because there was at least one nuclear power that reacted violently to this ambiguity being removed. The London Declaration did, however, say that any future strategy will require a mixture of conventional and nuclear weapons. What is in question is what is the minimum number that will guarantee the stability and the peace that we've had, like it or not, through these weapons for the past 41 years.

So NATO has the nuclear question on the front burner of the strategy debate. I think you're going to see a Europe very shortly that is free of the short-range weapons and I think you're going to see arsenals of strategic weapons reduced through the follow-on START talks.

Adam Bronson, York University

Mr. Lightburn, in your remarks you spoke implicitly, if not explicitly, about the new role for NATO in peacekeeping in Europe, and I would assume that means in Eastern Europe. With the potential for national conflict in this area do you see NATO, with the historical baggage that it carries with it, as being a peacekeeper, a peacemaker, a facilitator in this area, the European theatre – I would posit that it can't, and thus I would turn to the UN as the possible organization for this. Mr. Dmitrichev, do you see the UN being able to expand into peacekeeping into internal, domestic affairs of state, something

that it has not done yet, but it is moving to with UNTAG and the success of that, and possibly Cambodia?

A) Mr. Lightburn, do you see this as being a possible role; and B) Mr. Dmitrichev, if not NATO, can the UN fill this void?

Mr. Lightburn

Well, to lead it off, no. NATO is not going to be a global policeman and we've got to dispel all notions of that, and the strategy, when it comes out, will clearly indicate that. NATO can, however, improve stability and security in the European region through other means. The Alliance is currently looking, doing an economic analysis, of all the problems in that region. The co-operation of the 16 members that have been the strength of this Alliance can be applied in other ways than through military force, and the European nations in particular are currently focusing on assistance to Eastern Europe. There is a potential situation downstream. If the oil problem continues, and if the economies of the new democracies continue to not do as well as possible, you could see downstream somewhere the spectre of thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of refugees spilling over into the borders of Germany, Belgium, and Italy. In such a case the Alliance would have to take some kind of action, not military action, but some form of assistance. You may see the military being used in a command and communications way, in distributing food – all these things are possibilities. But certainly there is no intent for the Alliance to be a global policeman, and not in Eastern Europe.

There are three risks that the Alliance is really looking at. The first is simply to balance Soviet power; not to go out and do anything about it, it's simply to have a rough balance in the European region. As long as the Soviets have modern conventional and nuclear forces, there will have to be that kind of balance available to the Alliance, and of course everybody hopes that's going down.

The second kind of risk is to check any kind of a spillover into the NATO area from, let's say, a Yugoslavian problem, or from another ethnic problem. So, the Alliance is there to check that physically, and there you would get some military action.

The third part is to try and influence other risks in the world. I indicated the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as one of these.

One other point that this all brings up within the strategy is the whole question of out-of-area. The NATO Secretary-General has said that we will not discuss policy on out-of-area until the Gulf situation is cleared up, because there are so many complex, sensitive arrangements out there and the Alliance is co-operating through all sorts of means that are not on the table necessarily, nor in the press. But the out-of-area question has to be looked at; somewhere in the new strategy there has to be a broader, more outward look at the world.

Mr. Dmitrichev

I would certainly agree with Mr. Lightburn that the basic purpose and function of NATO is not to act as a policeman anywhere, even within the countries that constitute its membership. With regard to the United Nations and NATO, I think that one fundamental difference exists between the two, when you regard them in terms of security. NATO is a military alliance. The United Nations is a collective system of international security. The difference is that within the system of collective security, any member within that system that commits an act of aggression is to be punished by that organization, and by that very system of collective security. A case in point is Iraq. This is not the case either of NATO or any other military alliance, although we remember what happened with the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, and to a certain extent in Hungary as well. So these are differences to be remembered.

Your question also related to a very sensitive part of the UN's activities; what is the UN to do about conflicts within countries, and there are plenty of them. As a matter of fact there are now over 20 armed conflicts going on right now, and about 111 conflicts in the world which are not being fought out, but are waiting to happen.

Article 2 of the UN Charter, Paragraph 7, prohibits the United Nations from interfering in affairs which are considered essentially domestic affairs of states. With all of these conflicts going on, a very important question arises. How should the UN act when you have a situation of that kind – a conflict within a certain country. On one side you have that legal provision – no in-

terference. But on the other, the conflict is there; it may affect not only that particular country, but also its neighbours. And depending on the size of the country -- for example the Soviet Union; an internal conflict there would affect the whole world, and the security of the whole world. So what is the UN to do?

According to some experience that the UN has, it can do these things only in cases where the country in question invites the UN to help it handle that particular conflict. There are now proposals being discussed to use UN peacekeeping capabilities in countries with potential conflicts. "Prevention" is the key word now on the UN agenda. Even structurally there were changes which are geared to meet that particular need. A conflict that is prevented is by far easier to handle than one already going on; it's cheaper and less dangerous.

So we have experience in handling those situations. Namibia was a case in point. You also have Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, where now these talks are being held, and there is some headway being made. Hopefully the UN will be successful in bringing a peaceful settlement to those internal conflicts, but this is at the invitation of the governments concerned. So far, there is no other way.

And in many respects, when I was speaking earlier and referring to the erosion of the concept of national sovereignty, the UN is now experiencing that strait-jacket. On the one hand member states want conflicts to be prevented and resolved, in that they seem unanimous, but it when it comes to a particular state, to a particular situation, they resort to Article 2, Paragraph 7.

Maria Morvillo, Glendon College

Mr. Dmitrichev, in the last little while many concerns have been raised regarding the leadership in the United Nations, and there has been a call for restructuring and redefining of the leadership in the UN. Could you please comment on this, with reference to the recent leadership study by Sir Brian Urquhart.

Mr. Dmitrichev

I think that that very important study and other ideas expressed in that regard of late are very interesting. These suggestions do point to the fact that some qualities would have to be built into the institution of the Secretary-General. While everybody is happy with the present Secretary-General, this is a very important thing indeed, for the future, and for the leadership of the specialized agencies, this is a very important thing indeed.

We have the experience of UNESCO with Mr. M'bow; we have the experience with the United Nations High Commissioner's office for Refugees, and there are some other examples where the leaders have actually failed. The procedures that are now in existence with regard to the selection of these leaders, the qualities and requirements that these offices demand should be given very serious consideration when member states select their leaders in the UN and the other specialized agencies.

DON MACNAMARA

SUMMATION

Our discussions today have taken us through a wide range of issues and concerns.

At the very outset, Dr. Kenney-Wallace challenged us to consider the title of our annual seminar – What does Canadian really mean? What does strategic mean? What does forecast mean?

Dr. Kenney-Wallace reminded us that strategy starts with a good idea, it is a mindset: "I think, therefore I act". But, universities, a national resource, cannot act alone. Our national challenge is the need to know, to manage information and data. The explosion of communications technologies and resultant linkages reflect a changing global climate.

Are we teaching the realities of global interdependence? Do we understand the time scales over which change takes place? Universities should be in a position to lead change, not follow.

Our key to competitiveness will be the ability to think strategically, to be able to undertake risk assessment and analysis. We must understand that demographic trends mean an emphasis on human capital which will put greater demands on our systems.

Dr. Kenney-Wallace discussed the relationship between research and development and national prosperity, science and engineering activity and manufacturing output.

All of this requires human capital, the development of which requires other capital investment in our educational institutions so that we can come to grips with the challenges of a changing world.

High Commissioner Anderson from Jamaica quickly reminded us that there other major challenges in the world, especially those facing the Third World, and particularly small countries which find the pressures and constraints monumental.

These difficulties are intensified when one realizes that the EBRD was formed and financed in record time, while the World Bank and the IMF refused to deal with Third World debt. The allure of Eastern Europe is evidently going to be to the detriment of developing countries, at a time when they are beyond handling the challenges on their own. Events in the Persian Gulf only intensify the difficulties, as the jump in oil prices has had a startling effect on Third World economies, and other resources that might have been available to them are now being spent in the Gulf. All of this further underlines the theme of interdependence developed by Dr. Kenney-Wallace.

Deputy Ambassador Magosaki from Japan then reminded us of some of the forgotten truths in searching for comprehensive cooperation. In the past, he recalled, when discussing relations, political and military relations have been kept separate from economic affairs. In recent years, however, economic issues have become the most demanding political issues. Japan, he pointed out, is making political contributions through economic relations, and is now doing so with the People's Republic of China and the USSR. In the Persian Gulf, if the military contribution is to be paramount, Japan will fail to contribute. Japan's strength is economic and therefore should be contributing through economic means. International cooperation should be a matter of each country contributing from its strengths, remembering that not all football players are linemen, and wide receivers should not be employed as such.

Dr. Gerald Caplan then brought us an alternative view to the discussion of Canada's changing dimension – politics and strategy. He suggested that Canada's interests would be best recognized by realizing that we are not about to be attacked by anyone and we have no territorial ambitions. What is needed is a peaceful and prosperous world, leading to the questions:

- How does Canada relate to U.S. 'adventures' abroad?
- How does Canada relate to the Third World?
- How does Canada protect its sovereign interests – fish, drugs, and refugees?

A major "non-interest", he stated, is NATO. The Cold War is over and Europe has been marginalized throughout the 80s, by the Integrated Long Term Strategy paper in the U.S., among others. Notwithstanding this broad downplaying of the threat of attack in Central Europe, capabilities have not changed.

Although Dr. Caplan ridiculed defence policies and postures and proposed new policies from what may reflect a generous over-simplification of global issues, he did so in an entertaining manner. His view is one we must hear and try to understand, notwithstanding its tendency to trivialize important political and military strategic issues, thereby making it difficult to discuss them rationally. His conclusion, however, was one with which all would agree – a little more stable, peaceable and prosperous world is not an unreasonable objective.

Our luncheon speaker, Mr. Jeremy Kinsman, reviewed and reinforced Canada's interests in peaceful change, adherence to principle and a willingness to accept a world role, because we have world interests – and that is why we are in the Gulf. He emphasized that over-riding interests are in an orderly, peaceful and just world, operating the principles of international law.

Then Mr. Lightburn, from NATO headquarters in Brussels, reminded us of the startling changes that have occurred in Europe and the resultant need to re-evaluate NATO's strategy. The mental image of Marshal Moiseyev embracing General Galvin (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) reflects just how much change has occurred.

For NATO, however, determining his future directions will not be easy in a world that first relaxed after 45 years of confrontation and has again tensed over the Gulf crisis.

Mr. Lightburn stated that NATO should continue to exist to assist in the transformation of Europe, to contribute to security as required and, particularly, to provide a trans-Atlantic bridge. NATO does face challenges in developing a strategy and a new military structure, consistent with perceived roles, the demands for resources and, of course, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. Forthcoming events that would impaction these developments include the CSCE summit in Paris, elections in Germany, a new US congress concerned about burden-sharing and, in particular, the outcome of the Gulf crisis.

Moving from NATO collective defence to the UN and collective security, Mr. Dmitrichev reminded us that the UN set out human values and ideals to

save subsequent generations from the scourge of war. The UN has indeed chalked up an impressive score in progress in decolonization, peacekeeping and international law, but also was seen by many to have become a vehicle in the propaganda war.

The UN has been re-born, as a result of the momentous changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and growing cooperation between the US and USSR, but the new thinking in the USSR has to be a major factor.

Notwithstanding successes in international peace and security, the other global challenges remain to be addressed substantively – the environment, Third World debt and economic development.

The UN itself has financial problems as well as structural problems and global interdependence is seen to be working against sovereign states.

So, the UN must adapt to a changing world with new concepts, new finances and new structures for new hopes and opportunities in our global village.

Our final speaker, Dr. Pfannenberg, provided us with a fascinating personal insight into one of the most momentous changes in modern history. His was a unique view from the inside, from one whose personal Christian ideals sought the betterment of his country and mankind in the Foreign Service of the then German Democratic Republic. His personal goals and principles could not, however, be served by what he realized to be an unprincipled and politically bankrupt country and society. Germany, he said, has a role in its change, to be a bridge between East and West and even North and South. He called on us to go further and look at the underlying causes of conflict - and solve or address those questions – especially as they occur in the Third World.

Conclusions

And that brings us to the end of our discussions. The common thread throughout our day has been that of change – political, economic, military and technological. In addition, there has been the recurring theme of interdependence and the developing world, and its relevance to our national interests.

There is and will continue to be the need to develop institutions that can contribute to regional and global security, and both NATO and the UN have the potential to be more useful, perhaps, than they ever have been.

The challenge for Canadians, however, will be to develop policies and assign resources appropriate to our strategic interests at home and abroad. Their challenge not to be served by shrinking from responsibilities or failing to understand our place in and contribution to the world at large.

I wish to thank most sincerely on your behalf all of our speakers, our session chairmen, John Harbron and David Harries and especially our Executive Director, Alex Morrison, for a seminar that was first class in every way.

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